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PRESENTATION
The issue whether or not there is a God is one of the oldest and
widely disputed philosophical questions. Indeed, this has been a topic for
discussion since time immemorial, a topic, which has always been subject
for heated debates both in the fields of philosophy and theology. This ques-
tion is over treated in a sense, but people still insist on the issue, and in this
sense that the problem is actually never been exhausted. Although in the
field of theology its claim, through the aid of divine revelation, remains
firm all throughout, time and again new questions arise and new doubts
take place.
According to J.P. Sterba, despite the antiquity of the question about
the existence of God, new aspects of this debate have arisen recently. This
rise is partly caused by the developments in science and philosophy. It is
sad to say however, he continues, that many debates about God overlook
such recent developments and degenerate into simplistic rhetoric or mutu-
al misunderstanding. Other discussions of God’s existence become so
technical that only experts can follow them1. An apparently the same com-
1. Cfr. CRAIG, W.L. & SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, W., God?: a Debate between a Christ-
ian and an Atheist James P. Sterba (ed.), Oxford University Press, New York 2004, p. ix.
Resumen. Esta investigación intenta evaluar la
demostración cosmológica para la existencia de Dios
elaborada por William L. Craig, también conocida
como el argumento cosmológico árabe, que está
basado en el origen temporal del universo. Craig ha
unido las reflexiones tradicionales de la filosofía con
los recientes desarrollos de las matemáticas y de la
física, que conducen a afirmar que el universo no es
eterno, sino que ha tenido un comienzo definido en el
tiempo. Por tanto, debe haber una causa que sea re-
sponsable de su existencia, ya que todas las cosas que
comienzan a existir tiene una causa de su existencia.
Este estudio insiste sobre la posibilidad lógica de que
Dios no crease el universo en el tiempo y en la posi-
bilidad de que no quede implicado en su desarrollo
temporal después de la creación. Craig combina de
forma erronea los elementos en juego para alcanzar
la existencia de Dios y sus atributos.
Palabras clave: Dios, Argumento cosmológico, Ori-
gen del Universo.
Abstract. This investigation tries to evaluate the
cosmological demonstration on the existence of God
by William L. Craig, also know as the Kalam cosmo-
logical argument, based on the temporal origin of the
universe. Craig has united to the traditional philo-
sophical reflections the recent developments of
mathematics and physical science, both lead to con-
firm that the universe is not eternal but has started to
exist a finite time ago. Hence, there must be a causa
that authored its existence, since everything that be-
gins to exist has a cause for its existence. This study
insists on the logic of the non probability of God’s
creating the universe in time and the non probability
of God’s becoming temporal by His being related to
the universe after creation. Craig defectively com-
bines the elements in play in the arguments to arrive
to the existence of God and his attributes.
Key words: God, Cosmological Argument, Origen of
Universe.
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ment has Swinburne. He says that for the last twenty or thirty years there
has been a revival of serious debates among philosophers, especially in the
two English countries Britain and the United States, about the existence of
God. They are debates conducted at a high level of intellectual rigor. It has
been recognized that the subject is not only of the highest importance, but
also of great intellectual interest. Christian thinkers have been to the fore
in this debate, and the debate has led to a considerable growth in numbers
of philosophy students taking courses on the philosophy of religion. But it
is rather a sad thing that little of this, however, has reached the general
public. The majority of the public is limited to hear versions from journal-
ists and broadcasters who make them believe that the existence of God is,
intellectually, a lost cause and that religious faith is an entirely non-ration-
al matter2. It is for these reasons that until the present time questions re-
garding the existence of God continue to be an open issue. J.P. Sterba says
that it is easy why so many people remain interested on this issue. Precise-
ly because man longs to find the ultimate fulfillment of his existence,
which according to traditional believers, is only possible in relation to
God3.
Indeed, an inquiry such as the demonstration of the existence of
God is not just any other ordinary investigation. It is a subject which ac-
cording to Swinburne has been recognized not only of the highest impor-
tance, but also of great intellectual interest. It is the highest task to which
the human intelligence is confronted. It is for this reason that one can say,
as Enrique Moros puts it, quoting Leonardo Polo, that God is the most im-
portant subject in philosophy4. Jesús García López also says that philo-
sophic knowledge of God constitutes the principal objective of philosophic
investigation, precisely because it occupies the highest desires of man to
achieve an answer to the deepest question of philosophy: why something
exists instead of nothing?5.
Now, William Lane Craig is one of those who had seen the highest
importance of the issue on the existence of God. He, therefore, attempts to
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2. Cfr. Swinburne, R., Is There a God?, Oxford University Press, New York 1998,
p. 1. Among the distinguished scientists who somehow influenced the public thinking
about the issues against the existence of God, as given by the same Swinburne, are:
Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (Penguin Books: London, 1991) and Stephen
Hawking, Historia del Tiempo: del Big Bang a los Agujeros Negros Miguel Ortuño
(trans.), Critica: Barcelona 1989.
3. Cfr. WILLIAM LANE CRAIG, W.L. & SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, W., God?: a Debate
between a Christian and an Atheist..., p. ix.
4. Cfr. MOROS, E., El argumento ontológico modal de Alvin Plantinga, EUNSA,
Pamplona 1997, p. 11; cfr. POLO, L., Introducción a la filosofía, EUNSA, Pamplona 1995,
p. 180.
5. Cfr. GARCÍA LÓPEZ, J., Metafísica Tomista: Ontología, Gnoseología y Teología
Natural, EUNSA, Pamplona 2001, p. 500.
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offer a study which brings a new taste with the intention that this not only
reaches the highly intellectuals or scholars but also the general public.
Hence, this work studies Craig’s cosmological demonstration on
the existence of God, also known as the kalam cosmological argument.
Craig’s cosmological presentation on the existence of God is relatively
one of the contemporary thoughts widely studied this time. He tries to
present to us an interesting relatively new analogy, that leads to demon-
strate the existence of a God, particularly that of the Christian God, as he
claimed. What makes Craig’s work relatively new in a sense is his effort
to converge or collate all fields of studies, namely philosophy, theology,
science and mathematics, to come up to a more cogent proof of the exis-
tence of God6. According to Francisco José Soler Gil, perhaps this argu-
ment exposed by Craig is the most risky and daring argument of the exis-
tence of God, for the fact that it based from the origin temporal of the
world7.
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6. «William Lane Craig se sitúa, en cierto modo, al otro extremo de las posiciones
recogidas [...] puesto que no solo acepta abiertamente la posibilidad de cooperación en-
tre ciencia y teología, sino que sostiene que la cosmología moderna ofrece un soporte
racional para sostener la tesis de la finitud temporal del mundo, una tesis que incluso
para autores clásicos, como Tomás de Aquino, era una posición de fe, no demostrable
por la razón natural». SOLER GIL, F.J. (ed.), Dios y las Cosmologías Modernas, Bibliote-
ca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid 2005, p. xxiv.
7. «El riesgo de este argumento –pero un riesgo que, en cierto sentido, aumenta su
valor– es que podría ser refutado sólo si llegara a establecerse como estándar un modelo
del universo que involucrara la existencia eterna del cosmos». SOLER GIL, F.J. (ed.),
Dios y las Cosmologías Modernas..., p. xxx.
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THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
The following article discusses William Lane Craig’s attempt to
demonstrate God’s existence using the kalam cosmological argument.
Before giving into light Craig’s discussion of the kalam cosmologi-
cal argument, we may start by introducing a sort of account of this con-
cept; what does the argument particularly consist of and where did this
kalam concept originate. We will also try to compare and distinguish the
kalam style with the other leading cosmological approaches, especially
that of St Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz.
A. ORIGIN OF THE KALAM
1. What is the Kalam argument?
The kalam cosmological argument is one of the a posteriori argu-
ments for the existence of God. It is an argument which claims for a First
cause of the beginning of the universe. The identifying feature of the
kalam is its stress on the impossibility of the actual infinite. In other words,
it aims to show that the universe had a beginning at some moment in finite
past and, since something cannot come out from nothing, there must there-
fore be a transcendent cause, which brought the universe into being.
In the beginnings of the kalam argument treatment, proponents to it
merely adhere to philosophical basis to defend their ground, that is, that an
actual infinite is impossible, using the arguments of the impossibility of an
infinite temporal regress of past events. Contemporary adherents to the ar-
gument, however, gives the kalam claim its boost once again by supporting
and aiding the classical purely philosophical basis with the advances of
scientific knowledge. This is precisely what makes this classical claim
once again in vigor. Contemporary interests, as Craig puts it, arise largely
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out of the startling empirical evidence of astrophysical cosmology for a be-
ginning of space and time1.
Simply put, kalam arguments try to demonstrate: firstly, that the ex-
istence of an actual infinite is impossible and secondly, that even if it were
possible, the universe itself is not actually infinite and hence must have
had a beginning. «It is precisely the aim of the kalam argument to show
that the universe is not eternal but had a beginning. The universe must
therefore be contingent in its existence. Not only so; the kalam argument
shows the universe to be contingent in a very special way: it came into ex-
istence out of nothing»2.
2. The origin of the Kalam argument
The kalam cosmological argument has its roots in medieval Arabic
philosophy and theology. Although as a word, its roots go even further
back, but as a proof for God’s existence, the kalam argument originated in
the minds of medieval Arabic theologians3. The Arabic word kalam literal-
ly means «speech», but largely it means «natural theology» or «philosoph-
ical theism». The word came to denote the statement of points of theologi-
cal doctrine, and was later used to mean the statement of an intellectual
position or the argument upholding such statement. In practice, therefore,
it refers to the dialectical theology which is characterized by starting first
from commonly accepted premises and moving from there to various con-
clusions. It makes use of dialectical reasoning rather than deductive rea-
soning and is used for defence of scripture.
Basically, the process of kalam is an attempt to defend Islam in a
more systematic and rational way. In a sense, kalam is more characterized
as a theological attempt rather than philosophical. Although the process is
rational, they take the truth of Islam as their starting point. Ultimately,
kalam became the name of the whole intellectual movement within Arabic
thought that might best be called Arabic or Islamic Scholasticism4.
A scholastic theologian, or a practitioner of kalam, as already
slightly mentioned earlier in the first chapter, was called a mutakallim. The
original mutakallimu¯n were the Mu‘tazilites. This school of Islamic theol-
ogy came into being through controversies involving the interpretation of
308 OLIVER T. MAZO
1. Cfr. W.L. CRAIG, (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: a Reader and Guide, Rutgers
University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 2002, pp. 69-70.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Cfr. W.L. CRAIG, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Wipf and Stock Publish-
ers, Eugene, Oregon 2000, p. ix.
4. Cfr. ibid., p. 4. also cfr. W.L. CRAIG (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: a Reader and
Guide..., p. 69.
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the Qur‘a¯n in its anthropomorphic descriptions of God and denial of free
will. The Mu‘tazilites denied literal interpretation of the Qur‘a¯nic passages
and affirmed man’s free will, while the orthodox traditionalists adhered to
literalism and determinism. Thus involved as they were in speculative the-
ology, the Mu‘tazilites soon confronted Greek philosophical thought and
the challenge it posed to faith.
Rather than adapting the traditionalist attitude that one knows his
faith to be true without knowing how it can be true, the Mu‘tazilites choose
to defend the faith by the use of reason and thus to render their beliefs in-
tellectually respectable. Abu¯ al-Hudhayl al-‘Alla¯f5 took up the defense of
the faith (d. 840/50). In so doing, he introduced into Islamic theology
many of the Greek metaphysical notions, particularly the autonomy of hu-
man reason and metaphysical atomism that were to characterize later
kalam6. Influenced by Greek philosophy, adherents to kalam maintained
therefore that man could come to know God through reason alone.
Bound as it was to political considerations the fortunes of Islamic
theology with the Mu‘tazilites changed with the Caliphs. Thus, the
Mu‘tazilites dominated the world of Islam from about 833-48, when in that
year the Caliph al-Mutawakkil7 repudiated Mu‘tazilitism. The forces of
traditionalism sought to restore conservative orthodoxy with a vengeance,
severely repressing the Mu‘tazilites. A movement arose, which claim to
stand as middle ground between the traditional orthodoxy (also known as
Hanbalites), and the Mu‘tazilites. This movement was led by Abu¯ al-
Hasan ‘Ali al-Ash‘ari. It is to be known as Ash‘arites, defenders of moder-
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5. Abu¯ al-Hudhayl al-alla¯f is a Muslim theologian of the Mutazilı¯ school. Little is
known of his life. He was known for his skill in disputation and for his ability to quote
poetry. However, none has survived from his numerous theological, philosophical,
apologetic and polemic writings. He is reported to have been a hundred years old at the
time of his death. Whether or not Abu¯ al-Hudhayl first introduced atomism and the ana-
lytic method into the Mutazilı¯ kala¯m is uncertain; in any event, Abu¯ Alı¯ al-Jubba¯ı¯  (d.
913) considers that it is Abu¯ al-Hudhayl «who initiated kala¯m».
6. Cfr. W.L. CRAIG, The Kalam Cosmological Argument..., pp. 4-5.
7. ‘al-Mutawakkil, born March 822. He belonged to the Abbasid Dynasty. He
reigned in Samarra from 847 until 861. Unlike his predecessors, he is not known for
having a thirst for knowledge, but was much of a builder. He is characterized to be a
very conservative Sunni Muslim, who launched a number of discriminatory campaigns
against non-Sunnis in his empire. Al-Mutawakkil was keen to involve himself in many
religious debates, something that would show in his actions against different minorities.
During his reign, the influence of the Mu‘tazilites was reversed, and questions about
over the divinity of the Qur‘a¯n were ended. The worst struck were Christians and Jews,
who were stripped of much of the social positions. Christians and Jews were imposed to
wear identifying marks and honey-colored robes, denying them of jobs that will permit
them to have powers over Muslims. He demolished a lot of Churches and synagogues.
Despite these actions, al-Mutawakkil’s reign is remembered for its many reforms and
viewed as a golden age of the Abbasids. He would be the last great Abbasid caliph, and
after his death the dynasty would fall into a decline.
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ate orthodoxy. They were in constant clash with the traditionalists until
such time when the Caliph gave them freedom to propagate without re-
straint their doctrines. The Ash‘arites then maintained the kalam. But it did
not have developed so well until the time of al-Gha¯za¯li.
The Ash‘aritism came to be identified as Islamic orthodoxy. The
term mutakallim, which had earlier noted a Mu‘tazilite, came to designate
an Ash‘arite that which is opposed to a Hanbalite traditionalist. Kalam had
become the argumentative theism employed by the Ash‘rites to defend
moderate orthodoxy8.
The kalam cosmological argument then had its share of ups and
downs. It has been constantly disputed even among its adherents and much
more from its opposing position and from the group of those who claim the
purely philosophical side, which is known as falsafa9. This dispute with
falsafa though, only shaped more the ka¯lam claim.
The mutakallimu¯n, both the Mu‘tazilite and the Ash‘arite sought to
demonstrate that the universe is temporal and is a created thing. And from
this argument arrive to the conclusion of the existence of the divine.
B. THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AS DEVELOPED BY CRAIG
For William Lane Craig the kalam cosmological argument is most
likely sound and persuasive proof for the existence of God10. As we have
already slightly mentioned, this argument is based on the impossibility of
an infinite temporal regress of events. His point is to demonstrate the exis-
tence of a first cause which transcends and creates the entire realm of finite
reality. Craig formulates this argument in three steps:
– Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
– The universe began to exist.
– Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Since the time of Leibniz it has become almost the basic question to
be posted by thinkers who try to unravel in a certain extent the unknown
that lies behind what is there, his famous question «why is there something
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9. Falsafa is the Arabic word used to denote philosophy. This is introduced later
than kalam into the Islamic culture. While the kalam developed various forms of their
arguments from temporal regress, falsafa bases its argument from contingency, that is,
from the argument of possible and necessary beings. It is to the falsafa that Aquinas is
alleged to owe his own cosmology, particularly as regards the atemporal argument from
contingency.
10. Cfr. W.L. CRAIG, The Kalam Cosmological Argument..., p. 63; also cfr. W.L.
CRAIG and Q. SMITH, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1993, p. 3; also cfr. W.L. CRAIG (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: a Reader and
Guide..., p. 92.
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rather than nothing?» Craig on his part also started with the same question.
He also asked: why does anything exist at all, like the universe or matter,
rather than just empty space? This question then, according to him, allows
one to throw the consequent questions: Is this something existing has al-
ways existed or has always been existent, which means that there was no
instance in which it was nothing? Or is this something existing in one time
was not, therefore in a certain instant came into being?
If what is there has always existed then it is eternal. But if it came
into existence, another set of questions follow: Did it just pop out from
nothing independently on its own? Or was there some agent that caused it
to come into existence? Some individuals are ready to believe that reality
or the universe as a whole, if in one time it came into existence, came into
uncaused out of nothing. Others however, where Craig is one, find it ab-
surd the possibility of independent popping of the universe (if ever it
popped out) and they claim to attribute this existence to something that ex-
ists who or which is eternal, uncaused being for which no further explana-
tion is possible.
Craig believes, as he justifies it in his second premise that, the uni-
verse came into existence. Now if it came into existence, he holds that it
cannot just pop out on its own, for whatever begins to exist has a cause. If
the universe which has a beginning cannot pop out independently on its
own, therefore, it is left to no other choice or option than to owe its exis-
tence to a certain cause. Craig provides philosophical and scientific argu-
ments to justify each of these premises.
1. First premise: whatever begins to exist has a cause
In respect to this first premise «everything that begins to exist has a
cause of its existence», Craig dedicated a relatively slight discussion due to
the fact that this principle according to him is so intuitively obvious that
scarcely anyone could sincerely believe it to be false11. Although in his dis-
cussion he apparently endeavors to justify this first premise appealing
more to natural and scientific experiences which constantly offer us confir-
mation of this claim. Ultimately, however, in his book The Kalam Cosmo-
logical Argument, he tried to point out that this claim could better be de-
fended by considering it in two different perspectives or ways; deductively
or by way of intuition (a priori) and inductively or by way of observation
(a posteriori)12. This premise could be deductively justified as rooted from
one of the first metaphysical principles, which is the principle of causality
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«every effect has a cause» or everything which begins to be is caused. This
principle implies that «from nothing, nothing comes». And inductively, we
can prove this claim from the fact of experience.
It is important to stress that when Craig talks of the «cause of its ex-
istence», he does not mean a sustaining cause or conserving cause, but cre-
ating cause. Craig says that what we are looking in this premise is a cause
that brings about the inception of existence of another thing, and not any
continual ground of being13.
i. Deductive Method
Insinuating the possibility of considering the premise «everything
that begins to exist has a cause of its existence» as a principle a priori,
Craig limited himself by saying that the proposition «out of nothing, noth-
ing comes», can be considered a metaphysical first principle whose truth
impresses itself upon us. What does he mean by saying «in any case, the
first premise, even if taken as a mere inductive generalization, seems as se-
cure as any truth rooted in experience?» This phrase is likewise obscure for
«inductive generalization» as commonly and generally understood and ac-
cepted, is a generalization rooted in experience. So why would he say that
«the first premise, even if taken as mere inductive generalization, seems as
secure as any truth rooted in experience?» Not unless he confounded him-
self «inductive generalization» as an a priori principle, then he must have
used «deductive» instead of «inductive». Precisely, he says, «the proposi-
tion that “Out of nothing, nothing comes” seems to me to be a sort of meta-
physical first principle whose truth impresses itself upon us. In any case,
the first premise, even if taken as a mere inductive generalization, seems as
secure as any truth rooted in experience»14.
It is just curious how Craig formulates his words. Does he really
consider the principle a priori, that is, as an intuitive expression that the
mind has independent of experience, or rather not? It is maybe for this
same reason of the vagueness of Craig’s postulation that Michael Martin
says, «With a little elaboration, Craig’s acceptance of premise 1 is not
based on empirical evidence but on what Craig calls the “metaphysical in-
tuition” that “nothing comes from nothing”. But metaphysical intuitions
have been notoriously unreliable. Everything from the principle of no ac-
tion at a distance to microdeterminism has been intuited to be true only lat-
er to be discarded. Craig implies that his metaphysical intuitions are uni-
versally shared by all rational people and that anyone who disagrees is a
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crank or worse. Furthermore, it is by no means obvious that, once one
knows exactly what is involved in accepting premise 1, one will agree with
Craig’s intuitions»15.
In the comment above, however, I guess Michael Martin has con-
founded metaphysical intuitions with metaphysical principles. Metaphysi-
cal principles, regardless if they are intuitions are not simply intuitions, but
are necessary conditions that the human intelligence has, to be able to have
knowledge of what is real. Metaphysical principles are intuitions in as
much as they are evident by themselves to everyone. They are primary and
or fundamental elements in human knowledge which serve as bases for all
other truths. But they are not simply intuitions, because they are only
known by men through experience, natural and spontaneous it may be.
Some metaphysical intuitions might not be metaphysical principles but
just philosophical presuppositions. In this manner is this metaphysical in-
tuition unreliable, for in the first place they fall down to the category of
theories and suppositions which need to be verified. But simple metaphys-
ical intuitions as theories do not belong to the cluster of metaphysical intu-
itions as first principles. The first metaphysical principles, so to say, are
products of the first judgment. Hence, «The first principle is, above all, a
judgment concerning reality»16. It is not therefore an innate judgment,
which is possessed by the mind prior to the beginning of actual knowledge,
but the first judgment. It is not a sort of built-in intellectual framework for
understanding reality. This first judgment is called the principle of non-
contradiction because it expresses the most basic condition of things,
namely, that they cannot be self-contradictory. «This principle is based on
being, and expresses the consistency of being and its opposition to non-be-
ing (non-ens). [...] In order to formulate this judgment, we must first know
its terms (being and non-being). These are notions which we grasp only
when, through the senses, the intellect understands external reality and
perceives diverse beings; for instance, this piece of paper, a being distinct
from that typewriter, the “not-paper” (non-being). Since these are the first
two notions that we form, all men necessarily and immediately know this
law of non-contradiction». Now, since the first principle is the first judg-
ment, then it cannot be demonstrated by means of other truths prior to it.
«The fact that it cannot be proven is not, however, a sign of imperfection;
rather, we should say that it is a sign of perfection. When a truth is evident
by itself, it is neither necessary nor possible to prove it. Only something
which is not immediately evident requires proof»17.
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There are other primary principles which are closely linked to the
first principles; the «principle of the excluded middle» and the «principle
of identity». The principle of the excluded middle states that «“there is no
middle ground between being and non-being” or “there is no middle
ground between affirmation and negation”. This judgment signifies that ei-
ther a thing is or is not, with no other alternative, and therefore, it is re-
duced to the principle of non-contradiction. [...] This principle is often
used in reasoning, under the formula, “every proposition must necessarily
be true or false”. [...] The principle of identity states that “being is being”
or “whatever is, is what it is” or that “being is, and non-being is not”. Al-
though neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas Aquinas speaks of identity as a
first principle, many neo-Scholastic authors mention it, almost always re-
ducing it to the principle of non-contradiction. [...] At times other princi-
ples are also included among these fundamental principles. For example,
the “principle of causality” (“every effect has a cause” or “everything
which begins to be is caused”) and the “principle of finality” (“every agent
acts for an end”). Strictly speaking, these are not first principles at al, since
they involve notions of ens and non-ens (particularly the notions of
“cause”, “effect”, and “end”). Consequently, they already presuppose the
principle of non-contradiction, and they have a more limited scope»18.
What concerns us really is whether Craig considers the principle
«whatever begins to exist has a cause» really intuitive or a principle a pri-
ori, independent of experience or rather a first judgment from experience.
Perhaps Craig’s dilemma could have been clarified by distinguishing two
kinds of experience. According to Jesús García López there are two types
of experience: external (which is always sensitive for us) and internal
(which is within us, and they are rather intellectual than sensitive).
«Evidently, this direct contact that sometimes the knowing human sub-
ject has with the known reality, present in him, in his individuality or in his
singular and concrete existence, is sometimes given in the external sensi-
tive knowledge (and this is the external experience), but there are those
which are given in the internal sensitive knowledge (for example, in the
perception of the common sense, when we feel that we feel), and above all,
in the intellectual knowledge, when we understand that we are understand-
ing, or when we like, or when are working. This intellectual experience,
which is internal naturally from our proper acts, is no less secure or less de-
pendable to the external sensitive experience, given that it generates in us a
certainty that nothing or nobody could dither. Now, it is in this internal ex-
perience, of intellectual nature, where we really grasp the notion of
“cause”, and more concretely, the “efficient cause”. In the external experi-
ence we could certainly grasp the temporal succession of events or acts,
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that which we call effects in respect to other events or acts, which we call
causes and which precede temporally the first; but we cannot properly per-
ceive the causal relation itself, the bond of the effects with their causes, and
the dependence and subordination of the first to the latter, all that is con-
tained without doubt in our notion of cause, in neither of our senses (nei-
ther external nor internal). It is from here that thinkers who limit them-
selves to the external experience in order to explain the notion “cause”,
could describe it well, since they could only find in it constant and uniform
temporal succession, capable of generating in us habits or a custom, but
nothing more»19.
García says that in the internal experience of intellectual nature, we
clearly perceive sometimes certain causality which starts in the interior and
also ends in the interior, e.g. through the act of the will we start to think or
reflect over something; another times there are causality which start in the
interior and finishes in the exterior, e.g. through the impulse of the will we
start going or we hit something, and finally, sometimes there is a causality
which starts in the exterior and concludes in the interior, e.g. when we feel
and suffer pain from a prick which we received from the outside. And in all
these cases we live an experience interiorly everything that is essential to
the notion of efficient cause, that means, the action of the agent to a pa-
tient, the production of a certain kind of modification in the patient as a re-
sult of that action, the necessary bond of the first to the latter (which is not
mere temporal succession, given that in reality it deals of a simultaneity)
and above all an inevitable dependence and subordination of the effect to
the cause. In this internal perception or experience it is clearly manifested
to us that without the cause, the effect would never come, and that with the
action of the cause, the effect would not cease to become. It is from this ex-
perience where we really extract the true origin of our notion of the cause,
that by virtue of our intellectual abstraction, we take out, we elevate and
we universalize starting from the said experiences. And García asks, how
one can therefore suppose that it does not deal with a real notion, or that it
is not supported by reality, when there is nothing more real to us than the
fact of the knowledge from which we begin. The notion of cause is ab-
solutely undoubtedly extracted from reality20.
Indeed, the principle «from nothing, nothing comes» or that «what-
ever begins to exist has a cause» is so fundamental in man that even with-
out referring to empirical evidence, we can deduce it to be true. It is in this
sense that the principle is a priori, but although a priori it is always a judg-
ment which is always deduced from experience. It is evident to us that it
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need not be proven. «Only something which is not immediately evident re-
quires proof. Besides, if all assertions were to be proven by using other af-
firmations, we would never arrive at some truths evident by themselves.
Thus, human knowledge would end up ultimately unfounded»21. And so
therefore, if there are things which have began to exist, they could not have
come into unless a cause had let them to.
Now, the question still remains whether the universe indeed start to
exist. If it did start to exist then it must be caused, based on the principle
that «nothing comes out from nothing». Nonetheless, some atheists still
hold that it is possible that the universe just popped out from nowhere.
Others say that, indeed, we can imagine something coming into existence
without a cause, hence we can consider it possible that something really
can come into existence without a cause. Hume, according to Craig for ex-
ample argued that there is no reason for thinking that the Causal Principle
is true a priori, for we can conceive of effects without conceiving of their
being caused. Neither can an argument for the application of the Causal
Principle to the universe be drawn from inductive experience. But, the
trouble about this claim, defenders of the kalam would say, is that it is very
unconvincing and incredible to be believed22.
Hitherto, although in this case I could not presume an absolute
claim due to the impossibility to accommodate all positions, I dare say that
nobody has yet vindicated a contrary justification, proving the principle
that «nothing comes out from nothing», to be erroneous. This means that if
in the past nothing existed then nothing would exist now. Otherwise, one is
left to no other choice than to accept that things have always existed.
It is precisely for this reason that some thinkers, like the material-
ists, having found it hard to accept that there is a creator or an author of the
world, and that it is very unlikely that things just pop out or become from
nowhere, independently of anything else, are forced to introduce an eternal
fundamental something subsisting prime matter which carries out the
changes, a some kind of an underground or a sustaining ground formless in
itself which establishes the reality of change or becoming, a matter which
remains identical all throughout the change. This position, however, is also
refuted and is considered inconceivable, for this introduces us to a position
that the universe and its temporal series of events is infinite.
Even if the position contrary to the accepted principle does not in-
volve any logical contradiction or logical absurdity, for to imagine of
something coming into existence without a cause is possible, it does not
mean it could ever occur in reality. If ever therefore, there are things which
began to exist, particularly if the universe began to exist, then one can
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calmly claim that it has a cause for its existence, simply because nothing
comes out from nothing.
ii. Inductive Method
Craig says that the Causal Principle somewhat supports all cosmo-
logical arguments, when taken as an a priori principle, but more so when
defended inductively. Indeed, Craig says, if we appeal to our ordinary ex-
periences, these tell us that whatever begins to exist has a cause of its exis-
tence. These experiences are even supported by empirical generalizations
from scientific investigations. And for reasons that Craig considers the
claim that «whatever begins to exist has a cause» to be so obvious and un-
likely to be disputed, he somewhat limited himself in elaborating this
point.
There is however a little problem about Craig’s claim that «whatev-
er begins to exist has a cause for its existence» as a strong inductive gener-
alization. Since this claim is apparently not empirically verifiable. Even if
Craig says that the principle is even fortified by empirical generalizations,
but by experience we can not simply observe beings coming into existence
from nothing. We can however, observe of beings coming into existence
always from something already existing. Hence it is very crucial to com-
pare the event of creation to the things observable. For, indeed, what we
observe are only things coming into being from a previous act already ex-
isting. In a strict sense, they are not things produced from nothing, but
from something, some of which we can observe. What is empirically veri-
fiable are things which start to exist evolving from something. So what we
can actually observe are things starting to exist from something and not
from nothing. So the principle, if applied to creation, could not just be sim-
ply supported by empirical evidences.
Needless to say, even if we permit that the universe really initiated
order after the big bang and this theory gives us a logical reverse behavior
of the universe to reduce to nothing, this specific discovery still remains a
probability and is therefore only observable implicitly and not explicitly.
Hence, even the start of the universe is not just simply observable. This en-
tails that such claims of Craig needs more philosophic support rather than
just scientific. But, Craig somehow did not do such effort.
It might be for this reason that even if Craig insists that the principle
«whatever begins to exist has a cause for its existence» is self-evident,
Quentin Smith argues that neither can the principle be considered a self-ev-
ident, necessary truth nor can it be considered as product of empirical gen-
eralization. Because if we consider the principle from empirical generaliza-
tion, there is a decisive problem with this line of thinking, Smith argued.
THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 317
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 317
«There’s absolutely no evidence that it is true. All of the observations we
have are of changes in things – of something changing from one state to an-
other. Things move, come to a rest, get larger, get smaller, combine with
other things, divide in half, and so on. But we have no observation of things
coming into existence. For example, we have no observations of people
coming into existence. Here again, you merely have a change of things. An
egg cell and a sperm cell change their state when combined together. The
combination divides, enlarges, and eventually evolves into an adult human
being. Therefore I conclude that we have no evidence at all that the empiri-
cal version of Craig’s statement, “Whatever begins to exist has a cause”, is
true. All of the causes we are aware of are changes in pre-existing materials.
In Craig’s and other theists’ causal principle, “cause” means something en-
tirely different: it means creating material from nothingness. It is pure spec-
ulation that such a strange sort of causation is even possible, let alone even
supported in our observations in our daily lives»23.
I surely found sense in the comment of Quentin Smith. Simply be-
cause we cannot infer the principle «everything that begins to exist has a
cause for its existence» from the facts of the world. What, indeed, Craig
means for the phrase «cause of its existence», as mentioned in the intro-
duction, adopting the concept of the Medieval Arabs, is a cause that creates
and not a cause which only sustains or conserves. What he is trying to
draw about is something that brings about the origin or the beginning of
the existence of things, particularly the universe, if ever it came into being.
But, our ordinary experience simply does not justify the evidence of this
particular cause. So far what the world can justify are causes which sustain
and conserve, but not a cause that creates.
In a strict sense becoming of things within the world is not creation
but only a production of something from something else. But in the case of
the universe, what Craig is trying to extract is a cause of creation in a strict
sense, i.e. the coming of something from nothing. But without doubt, the
only empirical verification we can extract from the experience in the world
is the kind of verification we extract from becoming of something from
something else. We are only justified of a cause that sustains or a cause
which is a continual ground of being, but not a cause that really brings
about the inception of existence of another thing.
It is also for this reason that Professor Mackie argues that even if
the Causal Principle applies to events in the world, we cannot extrapolate
from the way the world works to the world as a whole. He says that to as-
sume that the universe complies with our own preferences for causal order
is not justified. And we have no right to assume that the universe complies
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with our intellectual preferences. We can simply work with brute facts.
«All our knowledge of intentions-fulfillment is of embodied intentions be-
ing fulfilled indirectly by way of bodily changes which are causally related
to the intended result, and where the ability thus to fulfill intentions itself
has a causal history, either of evolutionary development of learning or of
both. Only by denying such key features do we get an analogue of the sup-
posed divine action»24. He was entertaining the possibility that even if in
the ordinary experience nothing happens without a cause, it could be possi-
ble that it is different in the case of the universe.
Indeed, our natural experience simply does not show us of things
coming into existence from nothing, but only of things coming into from
something. Now, so far what the world somehow gives us is an observable
implication that everything that comes into being, comes from something
already in act. And we do not experience things popping out into existence
without a cause. Moreover, this phenomenon should not be taken to defeat
creation from nothing, by the fact that creation from nothing is not observ-
able. Since, there are also coming into being which do not necessarily
come from nothing that we do not observe, like the coming into being of
man for example. There is a relation between coming into being from
something and coming into being from nothing, in as much as both events
have something to do with starting to exist. It is true that, e.g. a house is
constructed from something else, but we cannot also deny the fact that be-
fore it was not and now it is. The house also comes into being. «No crea-
ture can be a cause of being as such, since activity always presupposes
something which already is or has the act of being (esse)». Created agents,
«are not the cause of the act of being as such, but of being this – of being a
man, or being white, for example. The act of being, as such presupposes
nothing, since nothing can preexist that is outside being as such. Through
the activity of creatures, this being or a manner of being of this thing is
produced; for out of a preexistent being, this new being or a new manner of
being of it comes about»25.
In a way, this principle of Craig has got something to do with the
third way of Aquinas. The principle «whatever begins to exist has a cause for
its existence» falls on the argument of contingency. The problem of Craig is
that he dared say that it is empirically verifiable that some things start to ex-
ist, but I guess this is just too much a presumption. What science is also
claiming are but just mere probabilities. Hence, Aquinas’ interpretation of
contingency is much more prudent than that of Craig. For Aquinas did not
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actually speak of things coming into existence, but just the reality that it is an
observable fact that we find in nature things that are possible to be and not to
be, in a sense that they are found to be generated, and to corrupt. Conse-
quently, they are possible to be and not to be. Now, Aquinas argues that it is
impossible for these things always to exist, for what is possible not to be at
some time is not. Therefore, Aquinas continues, if everything is possible not
to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. But if this
were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which
does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Hence, if
one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for any-
thing to have begun to exist; consequently, even now nothing would be in
existence. But, this is absurd, according to Aquinas, because we indeed see
some things existing. And having said this he concludes that we are left to no
other option than to admit that not all beings are merely possible. There must
exist something the existence of which is necessary. Now, every necessary
thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now, again it is im-
possible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity
caused by another. Therefore, we cannot but postulate the existence of some
being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another,
but rather caused in others their necessity26.
Aquinas was able to say all this because, precisely, what is not is
not, it is simply non-being. And what is not cannot but bring being for it is
simply nothing. If ever now we have something, the only justification we
can have for their presence is because it comes from something already ex-
isting, a something who has always been existing.
The problem whether the phenomenon of the cause and effect in the
world be also applicable to the universe in general, is resolved by the fact
that everything that comes into being is contingent, that is to say, it could
either be or not be. Now something that could be and not be is equivalent
to not having the being by itself, since if it has it then it should not be con-
tingent, but necessary, wholly determined to become. Hence, that which is
contingent necessarily has its being from another, i.e. it is caused. This ne-
cessity comes from the simple reason that that which is not cannot give be-
ing to itself, since to be able to give being it should necessarily exist, but at
the same time not exist to be able to receive it. But it is simply absurd.
Therefore, the principle of efficient causality is wholly universal or exten-
sive to the whole ambit of reality. Now, it should be clarified that the prin-
ciple of efficient cause does not establish that all beings are caused; rather
only those that started to exist27.
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Hence, it is unjustifiable if not absurd for the atheists, like Mackie
and Flew, or any atheist for that matter, to say that the coming of the uni-
verse, if ever it started to exist is just a brute fact. The words themselves of
the atheists could go back to them, like Quentin Smith who says, «the fact
the something is possible does not show it is the least bit probable»28. In-
deed, Craig holds, «we can in our mind’s eye picture the universe spring-
ing into existence uncaused, but the fact that we can construct and label
such a mental picture does not mean the origin of the universe could have
really come about in this way»29.
iii. Probable Objections to the Principle
It is apparent that philosophical speculations and spontaneous natu-
ral experience assure us of the principle that whatever comes to exist has a
cause for its existence. It is therefore impossible for things to come into or
to evolve into existence without an influence that realizes its becoming,
nonetheless, in special scientific investigations there has been an attempt
to defeat this claim.
There is a scientific endeavor which tries to bring down the princi-
ple «from nothing, nothing comes», and consequently Craig’s premise that
«whatever begins to exist has a cause for its existence», the theory of quan-
tum gravity.
«In the 1920s a revolution occurred in quantum physics that shook the
scientific community and focused attention as never before in relation be-
tween the observer and the external world. Known as the quantum theory, it
forms a pillar in what has become known as the new physics, and provides
the most convincing scientific evidence yet that consciousness plays an es-
sential role in the nature of physical reality. [...] The quantum theory is pri-
marily a practical branch of physics, and as such is brilliantly successful. It
has given us the laser electron microscope, the transistor, the superconduc-
tor and nuclear power. At a stroke, it explained chemical bonding, the
structure of the atom and nucleus, the condition of electricity, the mechani-
cal and thermal properties of solids, the stiffness of collapsed stars and a
host of other important physical phenomena. [...] In short, the quantum the-
ory is, in its everyday application, a very down-to-earth subject with a vast
body of supporting evidence, not only from the commercial gadgetry, but
from careful and delicate scientific experiments. [...] Uncertainty is the fun-
damental ingredient of quantum theory. It leads directly to the consequence
of unpredictability. Does every event have a cause? Few would deny it. [...]
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The cause-effect chain has been used to argue for the existence of God –
the first cause of everything. The quantum factor, however, apparently
breaks the chain by allowing effects to occur that have no cause»30.
The quantum theory claims that it is physically possible that the
universe originated uncaused out of nothing, space-time springing sponta-
neously into being. There are various investigations regarding this matter.
The finding was all about the supposed production of subatomic particles
in vacuum fluctuation which somehow manifests of independent produc-
tions of particles, which means that these particles evolve without any effi-
cient cause. To this Craig contested that the production of subatomic parti-
cles might lack efficient causes, but they sure have some kind of material
cause or energy. In simple terms these subatomic particles are still influ-
enced by and evolved from something, a kind of energy.
«Davies attempts to render this remarkable thesis more plausible by ap-
pealing to the spontaneous production of subatomic particles in a vacuum
fluctuation. In this phenomenon, a gamma ray converts spontaneously into
an electron and a position; similarly, if two such particles collide, they con-
vert into pure energy. Clearly, however, this quantum phenomenon, even if
an exception to the principle that every event has a cause, provides no anal-
ogy to something’s coming into being out of nothing. Though physicists
speak of this as particle pair creation and annihilation, such terms are philo-
sophically misleading, for all that actually occurs is conversion of energy
into matter or vice versa. As Davies admits, “The process described here do
not represent the creation of matter out of nothing, but the conversion of
pre-existing energy into material form” [...] Unfortunately, Davies’ exam-
ples only serve to underscore that ex nihilo creation is not an issue here: in
an intense electric field surrounding an atomic nucleus no new input of en-
ergy is required for spontaneous pair production when the negative energy
generated by the new pair of particles offsets the energy of their masses; or
again, in the gravitational field associated with a black hole the energy
locked up in the curved space can be converted into particle pairs. The ex-
amples only show that in such cases no new influx of energy is required in
addition to the energy already present»31.
Oppy admits that Davies confuses the matter by suggesting that the
evolving system evolved «out of empty space» by a quantum conversion
of the energy of the curved space into matter, on the analogy of pair pro-
duction. For this suggests that «empty space» should be invested with
some kind of reality, to parallel the role of the vacuum in pair production.
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Hence Oppy comments that what Davies ought to be suggesting is that a
quantum theory of gravity might provide the foundations for a descriptive
account of the uncaused evolution of space-time.
Graham Oppy, therefore, introduces the theory of spontaneous pro-
duction of virtual particles in a quantum mechanical vacuum. He admits
that the case is not yet clear, but neither the theory should be simply dis-
missed as unreal for these virtual particles have detectable effects. Now this
theory, according to Graham Oppy, goes beyond the expectation of the sup-
posed spontaneous production of subatomic particles in a vacuum fluctua-
tion. We have already seen that in the supposed spontaneous production of
subatomic particles might not have efficient causes, but yes, some material
causes. Hence, the spontaneous production of subatomic particles in vacu-
um fluctuation could only be considered a possible process of uncaused
conversion of pre-existing energy into material form. On the contrary, with
the case of virtual particles in the quantum-mechanical vacuum, current
physics may already tell us, Oppy maintains that it is possible for things to
begin to exist uncaused, that is, without either material or efficient cause32.
Oppy continues that «a natural second thought is that, even if there
are no processes in nature in which things begin to exist without material
causes, nonetheless, there may be reason to think that the universe could
have evolved from a state of zero mass-energy without violating conserva-
tion of mass-energy, provided that the total mass-energy of the universe
–ignoring the fluctuating contribution of the quantum-mechanical vacu-
um– is zero». He says therefore that in the case of production of virtual
particles «we are to imagine that there is neither efficient nor material
cause; rather, there is an uncaused evolution in which certain zero-quanti-
ties are preserved»33.
However, Craig notes that this seems to involve an incoherent un-
derstanding of the notion of something’s coming from nothing. It is inco-
herent because it supposes that something which comes from nothing
comes from a pre-existent state. And a consequently incoherent understand-
ing of the notion of the probability of something’s coming from nothing. «A
quantum theory of gravity has the goal of providing a theory of gravitation
based on the exchange of particles (gravitons) rather than the geometry of
space, which can then be brought into a Grand Unification Theory that
unites all the forces of nature into a supersymmetrical state in which one
fundamental force and a single kind of particle exist. But there seems to be
nothing in this which suggests the possibility of spontaneous becoming ex
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nihilo. [...] Even more fundamentally, however, what Davies envisions is
surely metaphysical nonsense. Though his scenario is cast as a scientific
theory, someone ought to be bold enough to say that the Emperor is wearing
no clothes. Either the necessary and sufficient conditions for the appearance
of spacetime existed or not; if so, then it is not true that nothing existed; if
not, then it would seem ontologically impossible that being should arise out
of absolute non-being. To call such springing into being out of non-being a
“quantum transition” or to attribute it to “quantum gravity” explains noth-
ing; indeed, on this account, there is no explanation. It just happens»34.
How true might be these recent scientific findings, scientists may
make claims to any resolutions they might attain, like, that it is possible that
something comes out from nothing. But I would agree with Craig that one
thing is more than probable, i.e. the evolution of whatever molecules or
subatomic and atomic particles or virtual particles is only possible thanks to
the condition that the universe is providing for them to happen. They are
such so technical that even scientists themselves cannot be so sure of what
actually they are dealing with. Indeed, this is still a case that’s been continu-
ously discussed. In any manner, Craig maintains that identifying nothing-
ness to something, in this case a mechanical fluctuation, is a mistake. Since,
in the long run, the experiments are done with something. Hence, Craig
says that «the central point to be understood here is that the quantum vacu-
um on which they depend for their existence is not nothing»35.
Craig would think that if only the experiment could be done also
with nothing. However, this would be absurd, for how could one make an
experiment with nothing. We have argued that nothingness is nothing and
cannot cause anything, let alone fluctuates a universe into existence. Sci-
entists could say anything they want and like to say, as Oppy himself at-
tempted to comment, but as regards to the quantum vacuum experiments,
the quantum vacuum, which underlies all of space-time reality is a fluctu-
ating sea of energy. The vacuum fluctuation is a physical entity existing in
space and time. It is for this reason that it cannot envision a genuine origin
of the universe out of nothing. To be more concrete, there are three main
problems with the quantum fluctuation speculation. It is based upon: 1) a
non existent theory of quantum gravity; 2) the use of imaginary numbers,
and; 3) the assumption that the universe was in a quantum state in its early
beginning and thus had an indeterminate beginning36.
Nevertheless, I contend that Craig has mistakenly assumed when he
said «[...] the causal proposition could be defended as an empirical general-
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ization based on the widest sampling of experience. The empirical evidence
in support of the proposition is absolutely overwhelming, so much so that
Humean empiricists could demand so stronger evidence in support of any
synthetic statement [...] it is [...] undoubtedly true that the reason, we [...] ac-
cept the principle in our everyday lives is precisely for this very reason that it
is repeatedly confirmed in our experience. Constantly verified and never fal-
sified, the causal proposition may be taken as an empirical generalization en-
joying the strongest support experience affords»37. And he is just right enough
to say that «this argument from empirical facts is not apt to impress philoso-
phers»38. Besides, if the recent scientific findings are true, then again they are
another reason to discredit Craig’s principle as inductively verifiable. We
cannot see things coming into existence from nothing. What we can only ob-
serve are things coming into existence from something already existing.
The principle «whatever begins to exist has a cause for its exis-
tence» therefore is more of a deductive rather than an inductive principle.
It is not a deductive principle in the sense that we do not need experience
to arrive to this conclusion, but it is deductive in the sense that our internal
intellectual experience is enough for us to deduce that whatever start to ex-
ist has a cause for its existence. Now this can not be an empirically verifi-
able principle because we simply do not observe things coming to exis-
tence from nothing.
With this supposition, one may conclude that the claim of the theist
of a something that has caused the universe of its coming into existence is
true. This presumption is true only in as far as the universe really started to
exist. But to say that this claim is a fact that is constantly verified in the de-
tail of natural experience is not convincing. Again, things coming out from
nothing, is not an empirically observable phenomenon. What is observable
are becoming of things from things already existing. Craig can therefore
not claim that empirical facts could be a strong support to justify the prem-
ise that «whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence», because ex-
perience does not show us of things coming into being from nothing. Nev-
ertheless, if the universe really began to exist, it must come from a pure
act, a cause capable of bringing something out of nothing.
The question still holds pending as regards the comment of the
atheist; what if the moon, the stars, the universe in its entirety has existed
for always? What if the universe is eternal?39. Would atheists be reasonable
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in excluding the possibility of a cause or of a Creator? If the universe is
eternal would this mean that it is uncaused? Not according to St. Thomas.
St. Thomas insists on the possibility of the universe to be eternal but at the
same time finite40. But again, is the universe really eternal and therefore
uncaused, or is it temporal? This is the question that we will try to answer
in the second premise, which is the major premise of Craig’s kalam cosmo-
logical proof for God’s existence. As of the moment, we may limit our-
selves again in concluding that if the universe started to exist, i.e. that there
was a point in an exactly unknown past that the universe was not and has
become, then there must be something that has caused it its becoming. This
conclusion can be deduced from the very principle that says, «nothing
comes out from nothing».
2. Second premise: the universe began to exist
After having partially agreed that whatever begins to exist has a
cause for its existence, we can now also make the question whether the
universe began to exist or not. These questions are rather not new to us.
These have been asked ever since the first recorded philosophical
thoughts. They usually go together when man tries to ask the sense of his
existence.
Why is the universe and where did it come from? Did the universe
begin to exist or not? Obviously, indefinite varied answers are available for
this type of questions. Theists hold that it started to exist. Atheists among
themselves are divided on their perspectives. There are some of them who
hold that it is probable and in no way ridiculous to entertain the possibility
of the universe’s popping into existence without any external influence
(e.g. Anthony Flew, Leslie Mackie, Quentin smith, etc). These group say
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40. «No es lo mismo un mundo creado que un mundo con inicio en el tiempo;
aunque por fe sepamos que no ha sido así, podría haber existido un mundo creado ab
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desde el punto de vista de la sola razón no hay demostración concluyente para probar
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necesario que hayan existido eternamente las cosas creadas; luego no es imposible que
el mundo tuviese comienzo. Las razones que partiendo de Dios, o de las criaturas, o de
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eternidad tanto como el comienzo temporal del mundo. Por fe sabemos que el mundo
tuvo un comienzo e incluso podemos aportar argumentos de conveniencia que ayuden a
entender lo que por fe creemos; sin embargo, racionalmente es indemostrable». A.L.
GONZÁLEZ, Teología Natural 4ª ed., EUNSA, Pamplona 2000, p. 236.
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that it is plausible that the universe have started to exist, but that its coming
into existence is just a brute fact. While there are others who, maybe for
the reason that they have realized the impossibility of one’s coming into
existence from nothing without a cause, and denying the possibility of a
Creator, simply say or are forced to maintain that the universe is just eter-
nal and uncaused (e.g. Russell).
Now Craig tries to answer these questions about the universe with
arguments from mathematical philosophy and science. He starts by prov-
ing the logical consistency of a model of the universe in which the uni-
verse has an absolute beginning by demonstrating two philosophical argu-
ments. The arguments prove that temporal regress of past events could not
go on to infinity: 1) the argument from the impossibility of the existence of
an actual infinite; and 2) the argument from the impossibility of the forma-
tion of an actual infinite by successive addition41.
After proving the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite
and an infinite temporal regress of events, Craig continues his second prem-
ise using scientific discoveries made within the last twenty years. These sci-
entific arguments serve as backup to the philosophical arguments concerning
the universe. He does this for the sake of those who are rather skeptical and
discontented with mere philosophical reasoning. This argument serves for
Craig to show that a model of the universe in which the universe has an ab-
solute beginning is not only logically consistent but also «fits the facts» of
experience. So he said that even if it is possible that an actual infinite of
whatever exists in the world, the behavior of the world itself denies this pos-
sibility. The argument is also divided into two parts: 1) the argument from
the expansion of the universe; and 2) the argument from thermodynamics.
He ends up holding on to the theory that some 15 billion years ago a great
explosion of a compacted mass initiated the order of the universe. This theo-
ry or shall what we say, this scientific discovery, only confirms that the uni-
verse began to exist, and practically disqualifies the existence of an actual in-
finite regress of events. Hence, he concludes that the universe began to exist.
Craig’s argument for the second premise could be delineated as fol-
lows:
i. Argument from the impossibility of an actually infinite num-
ber of things
ii. Argument from the impossibility of forming an actually infi-
nite collection of things by successive addition
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iii. Argument based on the isotropic expansion of the universe
iv. Argument based on thermodynamic properties of the universe42.
i. Argument from the Impossibility of an Actually Infinite Number
of Things
Craig formulates the first philosophical argument, the argument
from the impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of
things, offering three premises. He says that
1. An actually infinite number of things cannot exist.
2. A beginningless series of events in time entails an actually infi-
nite number of things.
3. Therefore, a beginningless series of events in time cannot exist.
1. An actually infinite number of things cannot exist.
Craig starts by differentiating an actual infinite from a potential in-
finite. He apparently based his definition from the point of view of the ad-
herents of the set theory.
A «potential infinite» is a collection that is increasing towards in-
finity as a limit but never gets there. Such a collection is actually indefinite
and not infinite. To illustrate this definition or description, he gives as an
example a finite distance. He says that any finite distance can be subdivid-
ed into potentially infinitely many parts. The division in half of each divid-
ed part can go on forever, but one will never arrive at an actual «infiniti-
eth» division or come up with an actually infinite number of parts, since
every time the part is divided, it could still be potentially divided. Al-
though of course the division becomes apparently impossible due to lack
of instruments or limited instruments we have to execute the division. But
in as much as possibility of division is concerned a whole is potentially di-
visible up to its «infinitieth», as Craig puts it.
Now, this possibility of division without limit of the divided parts
as to a distance is what it means for potential infinity, but not of actual in-
finity. For by contrast, an actual infinity or an «actual infinite» is a state of
being or a reality in which there is no longer the possibility of further per-
fection or growth towards infinity, for the reason that it is already perfect.
An «actual infinite» is not growing toward infinity; it is infinite, it is com-
plete43. Craig holds that the argument is not that a potentially infinite num-
ber of things cannot exist, for he accepts it can, but that an actually infinite
number of things cannot exist.
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Craig dealt with a group of mathematicians who treated the prob-
lem of the existence of an actual infinite. Their standpoint somehow agitat-
ed the claim of the metaphysical impossibility of an «actual infinite». The
treatment of the theory goes back to the 18th century with Bernard
Bolzano44. Then it continued with Richard Dedekind45, but the major de-
velopment of the argument is generally accredited to the Russian philoso-
pher-mathematician Georg Cantor46, by his set theory proposal. Cantor
worked with both infinite and finite sets. He suggested that the word infi-
nite had two meanings. The first is a magnitude which increases beyond
any indicated limit. Cantor called this the «improper set» because the mag-
nitude is always finite although variable. The second meaning of infinite is
that of the «proper or completed infinite». This use of the word relates to
the idea of real numbers. The conclusion was reached that real numbers
could not be defined without reference to a completed infinite set which is
what led Cantor to investigate the general theory of sets. Obviously, there
is still more to this simple presentation. Craig, in his Book The Kalam Cos-
mological Argument has a relatively exhaustive exposition on set theory.
Cantor claims that a collection or set is infinite when a part of it
corresponds to the whole. In other words what he purports is that there is
an actual infinite when we regard the points of an interval as a totality of
things which exist all at once. There is an actual infinity when a part of a
whole is equal to the whole47. But the question is how could it be possible
that a part may be equal to its whole? Another characteristic of an actual
infinite is that nothing can be added to it.
Craig defended that what Cantor is postulating is concerned exclu-
sively with the mathematical world, whereas the argument that he is con-
cerned with concerns the real world48. Again, the argument is not that a po-
tentially infinite number of things cannot exist, but that an actually infinite
number of things cannot exist in the real world. For if an actually infinite
number of things would exist this would produce all sorts of absurdities.
It is important to emphasize that Craig’s use of the word «exist»
means to «have extra-mental existence», or «be instantiated in the real
world» or «exist outside the mind»49. Craig, therefore says that Cantor’s
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cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 329
theory might be acceptable, but only in as far the world of ideas is con-
cerned. It is in no way applicable in the real world. It is for this reason that
it is no way a ground to bring down the kalam claim.
Craig illustrates a lot of concrete examples to justify the absurdity
of the postulation of set theory if applied to the real world or to things in
general. To repeat all of them here is obviously unnecessary. But let me ex-
pose the examples he had taken from a German mathematician David
Hilbert, the famous Hilbert’s Hotel, to point up the various absurdities if an
actual infinite would be instantiated in the real world. Craig exposes50:
We may imagine of a hotel with a finite number of rooms. Then we
suppose that all the rooms in this hotel are full. When a new guest arrives
asking for a room, the administrator apologizes, «Sorry, all the rooms are
full», and the new guest is declined of accommodation. This would be the
normal thing to happen with a fully booked hotel with finite rooms.
Now we can imagine again a hotel, this time with an infinite num-
ber of rooms, and suppose once more that all the rooms are full. Obviously,
this means that there is not a single vacant room throughout the entire infi-
nite hotel. Now suppose a new guest shows up, asking for a room. And
since there is an infinite number of rooms, the administrator would say,
«But of course!» and he immediately shifts the person in room 1 to room 2,
the person in room 2 to room 3, the person in room 3 to room 4, and so on,
out of infinity. As a result of these room changes, room 1 now becomes va-
cant, so the new guest gratefully checks in. but remember, before he ar-
rived, all the rooms were full! Equally curious, Craig says, according to the
mathematicians, applying the set theory, there are now no more persons in
the hotel than there were before: the number is just infinite. Rightly, be-
cause if the number changes and something is added to the present state,
that state would still not be infinite, but definite. But how can this be that
nothing has changed regarding the number, since the proprietor just added
the new guest’s name to the register and gave him his keys? How can there
not be one more person in the hotel than before?
The situation becomes even stranger, if we suppose that an infinity of
new guests show up at the desk, each asking for a room. «Of course, of
course» the administrator would say. And he proceeds to shift the person in
room 1 into room 2, the person in room 2 into room 4, the person in room 3
into room 6, and so on, out to infinity, always putting each occupant into the
room numbered twice his previous room’s number. Because any natural
number multiplied by two always equals an even number, all the guests wind
up in even-numbered rooms. As a result, all the odd-numbered rooms be-
come vacant, and the infinity of new guests is easily accommodated. And
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yet, before they came, all the rooms were full! And again, strangely enough,
the number of guests in the hotel is the same after the infinity of new guests
checked in as before, even though there were as many new guests as old
guests. In fact, the proprietor could repeat this process infinitely many times,
and yet there would never be one single person more in the hotel than before.
Then Craig continues that Hilbert’s hotel is even stranger than the
German mathematician made it out to be. Suppose that some of the guests
start to check out. Suppose the guest in room 1 departs. Craig asks if there
not now one less person in the hotel? But, «not at all» the mathematicians
would say. So Craig says, in this case, one can simply ask the house keep-
ing staff to verify if this is true. Suppose the guets in rooms 1, 3, 5... check
out. In the case an infinite number of people have left the hotel, but accord-
ing to the mathematicians, there are no fewer people in the hotel – «but
don’t talk to the people in the house keeping!» Craig again comments. In
fact, for the mathematicians, we could have every other guest check out of
the hotel and repeat this process infinitely many times, and yet there would
never be any fewer people in the hotel.
Suppose the proprietor does not like having a half-empty hotel (it
looks bad for business). No matter! By shifting occupants as before, but in
reverse order, he transforms his half-vacant hotel into one that is jammed
to the gills. One might think that by these maneuvers the proprietor could
always keep this strange hotel fully occupied. But one would be wrong.
For suppose that the persons in rooms 4, 5, 6... check out. At a single
stroke the hotel would be virtually emptied, the guest register reduced to
but three names, and the infinite converted to finitude. And yet it would re-
main true that the same number of guests checked out this time as when
the guests in rooms 1, 3, 5... checked out! Can anyone believe that such a
hotel could exist in reality?51
One would easily agree with Craig that Hilbert’s hotel is absurd.
There is just no way to avoid these absurdities once we admit the possibil-
ity of the existence of an actual infinite. Craig says that lay people some-
times react to such absurdities as Hilbert’s hotel by saying that these ab-
surdities result because we really do not understand the nature of infinity.
But, he says that this attitude is simply mistaken. Infinite set theory is a
highly developed and well-understood branch of mathematics. Hence,
these absurdities can be seen to result precisely because we do understand
the notion of a collection with an actually infinite number of members52.
«Logic implied, the proponent of the argument has two options open to
him. On the one hand, he could argue: If an actual infinite were to exist,
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then the principle of correspondence would be valid with respect to it. And
if an actual infinite were to exist and the principle of correspondence were
to be valid with respect to it, then the various counterintuitive situations
would result. Therefore, if an actual infinite were to exist, the various coun-
terintuitive situations would result»53.
Hence Craig says, «while the actual infinite may be a fruitful and
consistent concept in the mathematical realm, it cannot be translated from
the mathematical world into the real world, for this would involve counter-
intuitive absurdities. [...] Cantor’s definition of a set made it clear that he
was theorizing about the abstract realm and not the real world. Cantor him-
self held that the numbers of a set were objects of our own intuition or of
our thought»54. Hence, Cantor’s infinities are limited in the world of ab-
stracts and are divorced from the physical world.
Indeed, this notion of Cantor produces a lot of contradictions or an-
tinomies in the long run. One can imagine a determined set for example.
But when a set is determined it is equivalent as to having framed the set or
delimited its totality. Now, framing the totality or delimiting the totality of
something means arriving to its total perfection, the end or the limit of that
something. Where, further, it cannot perfect itself anymore, which to a cer-
tain extent makes the set finite. So that in reality an actual infinite is unre-
alizable, for once it is realized, it ceases to be infinite. What Cantor has
reached actually is an actual indefinite, something infinitely becoming or
happening, something which is changing and increasing without limit, as
the integers 1, 2, 3, 4...
Besides, there has been no mortal who has reached to the totality of
the real integers 1, 2, 3, 4. Since regardless of what one does, real integers
would only possibly increase and increase and increase without limit, as
one can observe and experience. However, this is not a state of an actual
infinity for real integers because in this case its totality is not been reached,
or will never be reached. This state of unlimited increase is just but without
limit, hence indefinite, which we also understand as potential infinity, an
«improper infinite» or a «variable finite», as Cantor puts it himself. Even if
we ask what the totality of the real numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 is, no mortal I bet
would be able to determine it. One could think of a determinate totality of
real integers and that is all.
Now, some atheists object that if an actual infinite cannot exist, and
since God is infinite, then God cannot exist. Craig contests that this objec-
tion is based from the confusion of the terms «infinite» and «actual infi-
nite». For, while an actual infinite is a technical concept found in set theo-
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ry that refers to sets and collections, of let us say things, God on the con-
trary is a being, not a set or a collection of things. Hence God cannot be an
actual infinite or God is not an actual infinite. In other words, when we say
God is infinite, we refer to his quality and not to quantity, while in actual
infinite we refer to the quantity.
2. A beginningless series of events in time entails an actually infinite
number of things.
According to Craig this second premise «a beginningless series of
events in time entails an actually infinite number of things», seems pretty
obvious. If the universe never began to exist, the situation would be that,
prior to the present event there would have existed an actually infinite
number of previous events. Thus, a beginningless series of events in time
entails an actually infinite number of things, namely, events55.
By «events» Craig means by any of the changes that is generally
stipulated to belong to the class of standard events, «that which happens».
He further says that this second premise is concerned with change. For
which he says that if the series or sequence of changes in time is infinite,
then these events considered collectively constitute an actual infinite. And
since the universe is not distinct from the series of past events, it would
follow that the universe is also without beginning or is an actual infinite.
But if the series or sequence of past changes is not comprised of an actual-
ly infinite number of events, then, as mentioned, since the universe is not
distinct from the series of past, physical events, the universe must have had
a beginning, in the sense of a first standard event56.
Appealing to the world of experience, Craig holds, «we know that
an actual infinite cannot exist in reality. Since the beginningless series of
events in time is an actual infinite, such a series cannot exist. So the series
of all past events must be finite and having a beginning. But the universe is
the series of all events, so the universe must have a beginning»57.
I agree with Craig when he says that if the series of events in time is
beginningless there would be an infinite number of past events, and this is
not possible because an actual infinite cannot exist in reality as demon-
strated in the first premise. But what perplexed me actually is the manner
in which Craig arrived to the impossibility of the actual infinity of the se-
ries of past events. Until here he has only dedicated to prove that an actual
infinite cannot exist in reality. And since the future is not yet fully realized
it could not be an actual infinite, but he has not argued for the impossibili-
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ty of the actual infinity of the series of past events. He only has presented
the series of past events later in his first premise of his second philosophi-
cal argument for the beginning of the universe. In a way Craig was already
anticipating his claim in the second philosophical argument. It even sounds
that he has deduced his claim of the second premise of the first philosophi-
cal argument from the recent scientific claim of the big bang. But again, at
this point when he presented this premise, he has not yet offered the proba-
bility of the big bang. It is for this reason that I assume that at this point he
was anticipating his argument or else he only generally relies on sponta-
neous experience. He might as well have thought that if given that there is
an infinite series of past events, no one will ever justify the present event.
Moreover, I guess that Craig needs to further explain what does he
mean when he lays down the universe as a condition for the temporality of
the series of past events. What does he mean when he says that the uni-
verse must begin to exist in order to explain the reality of the event of the
present time, or that the universe must begin to exist in order to reach to a
conclusion of a finite series of past events? Does he mean that the universe
has been created or has started to exist in time or from eternity? It is obvi-
ous that if the universe is eternal, the series of past events would be an ac-
tual infinite, but I think it does not necessarily follow that the universe has
to start to exist in time in order to explain the series of past events. There is
therefore no problem to state that the universe is temporal for indeed it is.
But the question I would like to raise, which I believe Craig did not treat,
is, if the universe started to exist, and if it is the beginning of all things that
happens, did it start in time or outside time? Besides, if the universe started
to exist, and is considered as the first event, can it be part of the series of
the temporal events inside it? Craig only gave us the options of either the
universe began to exist or it is eternal. But I guess there is more to the
question regarding the initial stage of the universe.
It is indeed a perennial philosophical problem or shall we say a per-
petual philosophical question whether the universe is eternal or not. Quite
sure, though there are still thinkers who continue to hold that the universe is
eternal, science could apparently oppose to them on this regard. And the sci-
entific position of the plausibility of the beginning of the universe, in a sense
leaves the proponent of the eternal universe on cold feet. And I believe that
this is what actually Craig is arguing that it is not probable that universe be
eternal or that there be an actual infinite based on the postulation of the set
theory adherents of an actual infinite. He has given a lot of examples of pos-
sible situations within an eternal universe, wherein if the actual infinite prin-
ciples of the set theory adherent are imposed, would lead to a lot of absurdi-
ties if applied to the present status of the universe. But I guess another issue
is to be had aside from the problem of eternity or non-eternity of the uni-
verse. This issue is the question whether the universe, if it started to exist, did
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it start in time or from eternity (or in a rough sense «outside time»). In other
words, if the universe is created, is it created in time or from eternity?
By creation here, we simply refer to the general understanding of
coming to be of something which was not58. So to say we mean by creation
that transition which occurs from non-being to being or from nothingness
to being. So, I prefer to use creation to signify the universe’s coming into
existence from nothing. I am not yet claiming here that creation is done by
God. Of course, generally when we talk of creation we usually associate it
with the act of God. But here, before anything else, I only want to clear out
the pure notion of it as coming of something from nothing, without yet re-
ferring it as an act of God.
Hitherto, philosophic thoughts have been divided on their position
regarding the universe’s status. As I’ve said, science might have advanced
a bit into this question by demonstrating and showing through experiments
that undeniably the world, through its physical behavior, could be reduced
to a point where it was nothing but a single and simple entity, even to noth-
ing. One could not just simply question this scientific position, especially
if he is not in authority to contradict such discovery. But if the universe is
where it all started, then it is not so persuasive to say that it has started in
time. According to Aquinas it is plausible that the universe could have
been created from eternity, since we could not talk of change and motion,
hence of time, prior to its emergence59.
The universe could be created from eternity, that means created and
emanated outside our usual understanding of time and still the temporality
or the finiteness of the past events is justifiable. This according to St
Thomas can be deduced from the simple fact that the world is contingent.
Surely, if it is in the universe where it all started, the first change or motion
could only be had after the universe was there. If the universe emerged
from nothing it becomes now the first act, perfect in its first instance, but
which is itself capable of further perfection. From this first perfection,
which could not be temporal, since measure of time was then inconceiv-
able for there was no change or motion yet prior to it, temporality could
only follow later. It is not hard to conceive of a first movement or change
that could take place in a universe created from eternity60.
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It is important to note, according to Aquinas, and I believe Craig
also admits, that in the assertion of creation, in the proposition «something
coming out from nothing», the preposition «from» signifies in no way the
material cause; it means simply a sequence. When creation took place, if
ever it did occur, Aquinas says, it did not take place in the sense that it is is-
sued from nothing as from a sort of pre-existing matter, but in the sense
that after the nothing physically, being appeared. «Creating from nothing»,
in short means «not creating from something». This expression, far from
putting any matter at the beginning of things, systematically excludes all
conceivable matter61. This means that prior to the coming into being of the
universe, or prior to the first instance of creation, if ever it is the beginning
of all change, one can not yet conceive of any movement, and consequent-
ly change, and not even time, for time precisely follows as the measure of
the interval of change.
Craig himself could even be read commenting that prior to the sin-
gularity should not be interpreted to mean that there was an empty time,
«for time begins ex hypothesi at the moment of creation. I mean that it is
false that something existed prior to the singularity». In this case how
could creation be in time if prior to it there was yet no time? So time as a
measure of movement maybe simultaneous with the first movement and
could be probable to must have come in an infinitesimal second after the
instance of creation or perhaps simultaneous to creation.
By definition, in physics for example, an act is a change, that is, a
sort of movement. Now what we normally can conceive is that everything
that passes from one place to another, or from one state to another, any-
thing that changes presupposes an initial place or state which serves as its
point of departure. Accordingly, where such a point of departure is lacking,
the very notion of change would be inapplicable. For example someone
throws an object. This object was consequently in another place, but notice
that that someone caused the object to pass to another. The change also
presupposes alteration not only in the thing changed but also in the author.
Quentin Smith also has the same observation while talking about his claim
of the non-evidentiality of the principle that «whatever begins to exist has
a cause for its existence». He comments that not only is the claim «whatev-
er begins to exist must have a cause of its existence» is not self evident, but
also even the fact of «something coming to existence» is improbable for
the simple reason that it is not observable. Smith says «all of the observa-
tions we have are of changes in things – of something changing from one
state to another. Things move, come to a rest, get larger, get smaller, com-
bine with other things, divide in half, and so on. But we have no observa-
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tion of things coming into existence. For example, we have no observa-
tions of people coming into existence. Here again, you merely have a
change of things. An egg cell and a sperm cell change their state by com-
bining together. The combination divides, enlarges, and eventually evolves
into an adult human being»62. Precisely, we cannot compare the event of
creation of the universe with the series of changes in the world because the
event of the creation of the universe is but a unique happening. The event
of the creation of the universe is just quite different from the series of all
ordinary events.
In the case of creation, according to Gilson, as it is generally de-
fined and which is accepted by Craig, it is just this point of departure,
this «something» which is lacking. Before the creation, there is nothing
tangible or physical and after the creation there is something. This posi-
tion of excluding a starting point in the act of creation, which impedes it
to have any movement precisely leads for some physicists, to conclude
that creation is impossible63. Jesseph, during his debate with Craig for
example has the same question and perplexity. He says «Why, for exam-
ple, should we think that universe began to exist? Why not believe that it
has always existed? Even “Big Bang” cosmology, which notoriously
gives the universe a finite past, says that time itself has a beginning of
the Big Bang, or at least can be interpreted this way. On that interpreta-
tion, the universe did not begin to exist, because there is no time at which
it did not exist. Asking for an event before the Big Bang is like asking for
something north of the North Pole»64. This realization comes when we
interpret the universe to have been created in time. But the probability of
the universe created from eternity is another option to a creation of the
universe in time.
The only legitimate conclusion, therefore, of the argument of cre-
ation is that it is not a movement. The universe could not be considered
coming from potency to act as in motion, but only in as much as before it
was only possible, therefore nothing, and now it is something real. In
that case the argument would be quite legitimate. Besides, if creation of
the universe comes from the pure act, it could not be considered as a fur-
ther perfection of the pure act. A pure act simply cannot be further per-
fected. Hence, the event that took place within creation could be consid-
ered an event which did not involve any physical motion. Changes or
motions or events that involve time are only physical changes. Hence it
is in no way unreasonable to accept that creation of the universe is time-
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less, and therefore logically could simply not be done in time if ever it
really occurred.
It is perfectly true that every movement we only know by experi-
ence is the change of the condition of a being, and if we talk of an act
which is not yet a movement, we do not know how to picture it to our-
selves. Whatever effort we may make, in consequence, we shall always
imagine creation as if it were a change, a pictorial representation which
makes it into something self-contradictory and impossible. But in reality
creation is something quite else. It is something for which we even have
no name, because it lies so entirely outside the range of human experi-
ence65.
Nonetheless, if «coming out from nothing» is the mode of the pro-
duction signified by the term «creation», then the universe will always ne-
cessitate some explanation of its coming to be. Otherwise, one would pre-
suppose that the universe is simply necessary. In this case, that which
needs justification will be the initiation of a temporal event in an eternal
universe and not the universe’s coming anymore. But if take the considera-
tion that the universe come into being, and we have deduced from the prin-
ciple that we have elucidated in the first premise that it is metaphysically
impossible that something comes out from nothing without any cause,
therefore the universe must really have a cause. Because if from nothing,
nothing comes, then we are left to no other choice than to credit creation to
a cause. This cause could be considered the universal cause of all being, an
act which is a pure act, immutable, eternal and therefore deprived of
change and motion, which is of course capable of creating, which we call
God. Now this production in creation could be qualified as first event; an
event which happens, but not an event which could be considered as
change. Therefore, could not be done in time.
We can therefore infer that the universe was the first event. Never-
theless, we have seen that although we can consider the event of creation
as the first event, we could not qualify it to be part of the series of events to
which Craig understands, if he understands «event» as the set of change.
To understand my point, perhaps it would be better to clarify the difference
between «event» which taken to mean to happen and «event» which taken
to mean to change. In my own opinion, an «event» taken to mean to hap-
pen is not the same as «event» taken to mean as change, which is also to
happen. Maybe we can say that all «events» mean to happen but not all
«events» is change. The coming of the universe would qualify for an
«event» that means to happen, but not an «event» taken to mean to change.
Since we have seen (even the physicists themselves claim it), that in the
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usual or normal sense of the term event as act or change which entails
movement, would only be possible through the intervention of something
already in act, as we have seen earlier. Again, according to physics any
event understood as change presupposes an initial place or state which
serves as its point of departure, accordingly, wherever such a point of de-
parture is lacking, the very notion of change would be inapplicable. But in
the case of creation, it is just this point of departure, perceivable and expe-
riential to us which is lacking.
Hence, in the first place then, we cannot consider the universe, es-
pecially if it did start to exist to be part of the series of the temporal events,
considered as change, inside it. For, its event is much more superior to the
usual events that took place after its assumed coming into.
Even if the universe is created from eternity there must be a point in
which the first event (change) (if we talk of first event), took place within
the universe (the first event that happened), thus explaining the series of
past events. The events themselves do not exhaust the enigma of all reality.
One can conceive therefore of a complete universe which has been created
from eternity into which the first event, change or whatsoever or further
perfection is being realized.
Besides, even if the universe did not begin to exist in time or was
not created in time, including everything what it contains, the series of past
events could still be justifiable. The reason according to Aquinas, once
again, is that the creatures or the created beings, though they have existed
for always, still remain creatures which for always need explanation66. This
conclusion is extracted from the fact of the creatures’ contingency; before
they were not and now they are. Craig may comment that this argument
rather appears to be Leibnizian, but this is not. For, according to Craig,
when Leibniz gave in to the consideration that the universe is eternal, and
still insist that it has still to have a reason for its existence, Leibniz was re-
ferring for a final cause of the eternal universe and not for an efficient
cause. However, Aquinas surely does not refer the reason for the universe’s
existence to a final cause but only to an efficient cause by emphasizing the
universe’s contingency and all it contains, before they were not and now
they are. So there is no way that this be a Leibnizian reason.
Hence, it could have been better if Craig limited himself by saying
that a beginningless series of events entail an actually infinite number of
things. Then he could have explained that this position is not justifiable for
the reason that an infinite temporal regress of events is impossible. Be-
cause if the temporal regress of events is infinite, then the present event
could never be explained. But to say that the universe is part of the series
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of past events, and to put it as a condition for the finiteness of temporal
past events, seems unconvincing67.
3. Therefore, a beginningless series of events in time cannot exist.
Craig says, therefore, that if the above two premises are true, that is,
1) that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist, and 2) that a be-
ginningless series of events in time entails an actually infinite number of
things, then the conclusion follows logically that the series of past events
must be finite and have a beginning. Now, in as much as the premises are
concerned, the conclusion of Craig could be logically true. But then he
added, «Since, as I said, the universe is not distinct from the series of
events, the universe therefore began to exist»68. In this point, sadly, as a
logical consequence of my opinion in the second premise, I bid to question
Craig once again. I agree that the series of past events must be finite for an
actually infinite series of past events would make it impossible to explain
the present event. But I do not agree that the universe necessarily must be
temporal at its coming into being just because it is part of the series of past
events.
ii. Argument from the Impossibility of Forming an Actually Infinite
Collection of Things by Successive Addition
This argument is the second philosophical argument of Craig for
the beginning of the universe. The difference between this argument from
the previous is that this argument, according to Craig, does not deny that
an actually infinite number of things can exist. It rather denies that a col-
lection containing an actually infinite number of things can be formed by
adding one member after another69. In other words, Craig is trying to justi-
fy that an actual infinite cannot be realized by successively adding things
or whatever. It is only in this argument that he tries to justify the impossi-
bility of a series of past event without beginning. It is observable therefore
that Craig intends to delimit his general claim of the impossibility of the
existence of an actual infinite in the real world. It appears that the possibil-
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ity of forming a collection by successive addition is only one of the possi-
bilities in attempting to form an actual infinite. In any case, Craig holds
that this method or attempt to form the infinite is untenable.
Craig formulates this argument into three steps:
1. The series of event in time is a collection formed by successive
addition.
2. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually
infinite.
3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.
1. The series of event in time is a collection formed by successive
addition.
In this step Craig only affirms that the past did not spring into being
whole and entire but was formed sequentially, one event occurring after
another. The events did not exist simultaneously, but they have existed one
after another. Hence, when we talk about the collection of «all past
events», we are talking about a collection that has been formed by adding
one member after another. We can also notice, he continues, that the direc-
tion of this formation is forward in the sense that the collection of events
grows with time. Although we sometimes speak of an «infinite temporal
regress» of events, in reality an infinite past would be an «infinite temporal
progress» of events with no beginning and its end in the present70.
This is rather a simple presentation of Craig. And I believe every-
body would agree with it without question. Craig did not claim any strange
notion other than affirming what is nakedly observable fact in the world
we have, that events happen one at a time and never simultaneously. There
might be events which happen at the same instant at the same moment, but
they entail different realities.
2. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually
infinite.
In the second step of the argument, Craig tries to tell us that these
events, mentioned in the first step, which happen in a successive manner or
one after another, regardless how much you add them one after another,
can never actually form an actual infinity.
So Craig argues that «a collection formed by successive addition
cannot be actually infinite». For regardless how much one adds to the col-
lection, there will always be a possibility of adding it another one71. Craig
says that this step is crucial. This argument, he says, is sometimes called
the impossibility of counting to infinity or the impossibility of traversing
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the infinite. Again, for no matter how many members one adds to the col-
lection, he could always add one more. He maintains that this impossibili-
ty has nothing to do with the amount of time available: no matter how
much time one has at one’s disposal, an actual infinite cannot be so
formed. For no matter how many numbers one counts or how many steps
one takes, one can always add or take one more before arriving at infini-
ty72.
It seems rather observable that what Craig is trying to delineate
here is still the impossibility of an actual infinite. The argument serves as a
continuation to the first philosophical argument because it only provides a
particular venture or possibility how to reach an actually infinity. In this
way, what Craig was still up to conclude is that an actual infinity in the real
world is impossible. We have to remember that his actual infinity is based
on the concept of the set theory view of actual infinity, that is, a total corre-
spondence of the parts to the whole. There is actual infinity if one reaches
to a state in which one can say that the whole is no longer greater than its
parts, or that the parts are equal to the whole.
So what actually Craig has here is a repetition of his previous argu-
ment or a continuation, but not a totally different argument as Craig
claims. As we remember in his first argument he says that an actual infinite
in the real world is impossible, which concludes that a beginningless series
of past events in time cannot exist. Now, in this argument he says, «an ac-
tual infinite collection of things cannot be formed by successive addition».
Although, he says that the difference of this argument to the first is that,
here it could be presumed that an actual infinite could exist, but even if an
actual infinite exists, a collection of things by successive events cannot
form an actual infinite. But it still talks of the non possibility of the exis-
tence of an actual infinite. The only difference is that the first argument is a
backward movement of the impossibility of an actual infinite, while in this
second argument the movement is forward. So I do not see really any dif-
ference between the first argument and the second, aside from the second
argument’s being redundant to the claim of the first. Besides the examples
he gave in the previous argument are but the same examples that conclude
the impossibility of an actual infinite in the real world.
I prefer to present once again what Craig actually argued in this sec-
ond philosophical step. So he says:
«Now, someone might say that while an infinite collection cannot be
formed by beginning at a point and adding members, nevertheless, an infi-
nite collection could be formed by never beginning but ending at a point,
that is to say, ending at a point after having added one member after another
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from eternity. But this method seems even more unbelievable than the first
method. If one cannot count to infinity, how can one count down from in-
finity? If one cannot traverse it by moving in one direction, how can one
traverse it by moving in the opposite direction?»73
«Indeed, the idea of a beginningless temporal series of events end-
ing in the present seems absurd». Craig invites us to consider Tristam
Shandy, who, in the novel by Sterne, writes his autobiography so slowly
that it takes him a whole year to record the events of a single day. Now, ac-
cording to Bertrand Russell, if Tristam Shandy were only immortal, then
the entire book could be completed, since by the Principle of Correspon-
dence to each day there would correspond one year, and both are infinite.
However, Craig says that this assertion of Russell is wholly untenable, for
the simple reason that the future is in reality a potential infinite only. So
that even if Tristam Shandy would write for ever, he would only get farther
and farther behind. And instead of finishing his autobiography he would
progressively approach a state in which he would be infinitely far behind.
He would never reach such a state because the years and, hence, the days
of his life would always be finite in number, though indefinitely increas-
ing74.
This part is quite easy to follow. It presents that Tristam Shandy,
even if he will live without end, therefore, will have all the time to write
down the events of his life, but if he needs a whole year to write down the
events of a single day, will never be able to finish his autobiography. For,
by the time he is able to write the events of a single day, another 365 events
already transpired which he has to write, which once again need a whole
year for each to be written completely. Hence, even if Tristam Shandy is
immortal, he will never be able to complete writing his autobiography for
each time he finishes one, and he intends to write consecutively the daily
events of his life, then another 365 days come. And as long as the same
process continues, Tristam Shandy will only be farther from finishing his
autobiography. Craig simply says that in reality, the ideology of the princi-
ple of correspondence simply will not work in this reality.
Craig continues, «Suppose Tristam Shandy has been writing from
eternity past at the rate of one day per year. Should not Tristam Shandy
now be infinitely far behind? For, if he has lived for an infinite number of
years, Tristam Shandy has recorded an equally infinite number of past
days. Given the thoroughness of his autobiography, these days are all con-
secutive days. At any point in the past or present, therefore, Tristam
Shandy has recorded a beginningless, infinite series of consecutive days.
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But now the question inevitably arises: Which days are these? Where in
the temporal series of events are the days recorded by Tristam Shandy at
any given point? The answer can only be that they are days infinitely dis-
tant from the present. For there is no day on which Tristam Shandy is writ-
ing which is finitely distant from the last recorded day. This may be seen
through an incisive analysis of the Tristam Shandy paradox given by
Robin Small. He points out that if Tristam Shandy has been writing for one
year’s time, then the most recent day he could have recorded is one year
ago. But if he has been writing two years, then that same day could not
have been recorded by him. For since his intention is to record consecutive
days of his life, the most recent day he could have recorded is the day im-
mediately after a day at least two years ago. This is because it takes a year
to record a day, so that to record two days he must have two years. Similar-
ly, if he has been writing three years, then the most recent day recorded
could be no more recent than three years and two days ago. In other words,
the longer he has written the further behind he has fallen. In fact, the reces-
sion into the past of the most recent recordable day can be plotted accord-
ing to the formula (present date-n years of writing)+n - 1 days. But what
happens if Tristam Shandy has, ex hypothesi, been writing for an infinite
number of years? The most recent day of his autobiography recedes to in-
finity, that is to say, to a day infinitely distant from the present. Nowhere in
the past at a finite series of days which he has recorded are days which lie
at an infinite temporal distance from the present. But there is no way to tra-
verse the temporal interval from an infinitely distant event to the present,
or, more technically, for an event which was once present to recede to an
infinite temporal distance. Since the task of writing one’s autobiography at
the rate of one year per day seems obviously coherent, what follows from
the Tristam Shandy story is that an infinite series of past events is ab-
surd»75.
Craig continues that a deeper absurdity bursts into view. «For even
if every recorded past event lies at only a finite distance from the present,
still, if the series of past events is actually infinite, we may ask, why did
Tristam Shandy not finish his autobiography yesterday or the day before,
since by then an infinite series of events had already elapsed? No matter
how far along the series of past events one regresses, Tristam Shandy
would have already completed his autobiography. Therefore, at no point in
the infinite series of past events could he be finishing the book. We could
never look over Tristam Shandy’s shoulder to see if he were now writing
the last page. For at any point an actually infinite sequence of events would
have transpired and the book would have already been completed. Thus, at
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no time in eternity will we find Tristam Shandy writing, which is absurd,
since we supposed him to be writing from eternity. And at no point will he
finish the book, which is equally absurd, because for the book to be com-
pleted he must at some point have finished. [...] These illustrations reveal
the absurdities involved in trying to form an actually infinite collection of
things by successive addition. Hence, set theory has been purged of all
temporal concepts; as Russell says, classes which are infinite are given all
at once by the defining properties of their members, so that there is no
question of “completion” or of successive synthesis’76. The only way an
actual infinite could come to exist in the real world would be by being cre-
ated all at once, simply in a moment. It would be a hopeless undertaking to
try to form it by adding one member after another»77.
It is quite observable, from the example I have just re-presented
above, that there are two points of views which will never be reconciled as
regards the possibility of the existence of actual infinity in as much as each
of the arguments is based from different grounds. One view deals with the
case sustaining the circumstances in the real world (Craig), and another
view deals with the case maintaining the possiblities of the world of ideas
(Russell). Russell maintains that, in the case of Tristam Shandy, applying
the principles of set theory for actual infinity, if Tristam is immortal, it is as
if one year for him becomes equivalent already to one day. Maybe Russell
has in mind that when one is immortal, and hence, exits forever, time will
no longer apply to him. Hence, even in the case of Tristam Shandy, where
it takes him one year to finish writing an event of his life for a day, if he is
immortal, then his writing for a year will in all probability appear to be just
a job of a day. For this reason that regardless how, let us say, slow is Tris-
tam in writing, he will always be up to date.
Russell therefore in his argument was introducing the possibility of
simultaneous occurrence of event. In this case, all absurdities would come
if this possibility be applied in reality. The first absurdity we encounter, if
everything happens simultaneously, is that time, days and years, duration
can never be conceived. Because what Russell is actually offering is the
possibility of events happening all at the same time, what is now the pur-
pose of tomorrow if even the whole year is already equal to one day, or the
day is equal to a second, or even to a single instant? Now, this is precisely
what Craig is trying to refute, for the reason that, events never happen si-
multaneously in reality. The only manner wherein events could happen si-
multaneously, Craig says, is by God to create everything all at once, then
in this case we can have perhaps an actual infinite. But this is not what we
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see in the real world. Since what we see are events happening, taking
place, one after another. And regardless how much one adds to the events
there will always be another event that will take place. Hence, an actual in-
finite cannot be formed by successive addition.
Mackie’s objections to this premise, Craig defends, «[...] are off the
target. He thinks that the argument illicitly assumes an infinitely distant
starting point in the past and then pronounces it impossible to travel from
that point to today. If we take the notion of infinity seriously, he says, we
must say that in the infinite past there would be no starting point whatever,
not even an infinitely distant one. Yet from any given point in the past,
there is only a finite distance to the present»78.
«The fact that there is no beginning at all, not even an infinitely dis-
tant one, makes the problem worse, not better. It is thus not the proponent
of kalam argument who fails to take infinity seriously. To say the infinite
past could have been formed by adding one member after another is like
saying someone has just succeeded in writing down all the negative num-
bers, ending at - 1. And we may ask, how is Mackie’s point that from any
given moment in the past there is only a finite distance to the present even
relevant to the issue? The defender of the kalam argument could agree to
this without batting an eye. For the issue is how the whole series can be
formed, not a finite portion of it. Does Mackie think that because every fi-
nite segment of the series can be formed by successive addition, the whole
series can be so formed? That is logically fallacious as saying that because
every part of an elephant is light in weight, the whole elephant is light in
weight. Mackie’s point is therefore irrelevant. It seems that this premise of
the argument remains undefeated by his objections»79. Again, I think that
the key point of the irreconcilability of the two grounds is that each takes
the argument from two diverse perspectives. While Craig talks in reference
to reality, Russell and Mackie talk from the point of view of ideas.
3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.
Given the truth of the premises, the conclusion logically follows. If
the universe did not begin to exist a finite time ago, then the present mo-
ment would never arrive. But obviously it has arrived. Therefore, we know
that the universe is finite in the past and began to exist80.
Surely both the philosophical arguments given by Craig are persua-
sive arguments. It is indeed easy to accept that it is impossible that an actu-
al infinite exists in this world. Likewise, it is impossible to traverse an ac-
tual infinite. But neither of the two impossibilities supports the conclusion
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that the universe must begin to exist or that the universe was caused to ex-
ist from nothing by a personal Creator.
The reality that an actual infinite temporal series of past events can-
not exist does not demand with necessity that the universe was caused to
exist from nothing. The only consistent implication to the claim that it is
impossible that an actual infinite exists or that an infinite series of past
events happens is the probability that change in the world had a beginning,
but not the universe itself as a whole. In other words, what is implied in the
impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite is a finite temporal series
of events, but a temporal series which could calmly take place within an
eternal eventless universe.
An exposition from Stewart Goetz on the possibility of the finite-
ness of the series of past events in an eternal quiescent universe can be
found in the discussion of the third premise of Craig. Goetz says, «Craig
himself concludes his argument for a personal Creator by affirming that
the creation of the universe was “the action of a personal agent who freely
chooses” to create the universe. A personal agent who freely creates the
universe is an agent who is not caused to exercise its causal power to pro-
duce its effect (or, if it caused its exercise of causal power). [...] If his argu-
ments for the impossibility of traversing and actual infinite are sound, what
he has proved is either that the universe was caused to exist ex nihilo by a
personal Creator or that the universe always existed and was quiescent un-
til some personal agent initiated a finite chain of events in it»81.
iii. Argument Based on the Isotropic Expansion of the Universe
Craig then makes a short history of the development to the theory
of the isotropic expansion of the universe. This theory has been initiated by
Albert Einstein in 1917, as an application to what he discovered about his
relativity theories, which he calls the general theory of relativity. The theo-
ry of relativity assumed that 1) the universe is homogeneous and isotropic
and 2) the universe is in a steady state, with a constant mean mass density
and a constant curvature of space. Data tell us that this essential assump-
tion of Einstein was insufficient and has to be changed along his investiga-
tion. Einstein himself discovered that his initial theories did not permit a
consistent model of the universe. In short, this initial theory of Einstein,
with the assistance of de Sitter, ended up evolving into a model of an ex-
panding universe instead of static. The theory is further developed by the
Russian mathematician Alexander Friedman and the Belgian astronomer
THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 347
81. S. GOETZ, «Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument», Faith and Philosophy 6
(1989) 102.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 347
Georges Lemaître. These two were able to formulate independently in the
1920s solutions to the field equation which predicted an expanding uni-
verse which began in a state of high density82.
The Friedman-Lamaître model then served as hint that the uni-
verse could no longer be adequately treated as a static entity existing, in
effect, timelessly. Rather the universe has a history, and time will not be
a matter of difference for our investigation of the cosmos. The work of
Friedman-Lamaître, however, was all still theoretical work. But while
this purely theoretical work was going on, 1929 the astronomer Edwin
Hubble showed that the red shift in the optical spectra of light from dis-
tant galaxies was a common feature of all measured galaxies and was
proportional to their distance from us. This red shift was taken to be a
Doppler effect indicative of the recessional motion of the light source in
the line of sight. Experiment shows that when a source is moving toward
an observer, there is a blue shift in the spectral line; when the source is
receding, a red shift occurs. Hubble demonstrated that not only are all
measured galaxies receding, but that their velocity of recession is propor-
tional to their distance from us. In short, what Hubble had discovered
was not only a universe which is expanding, but a universe whose expan-
sion is isotropic, a state of the universe already predicted by Friedman
and Lamaître on the basis of Einstein’s GTR (General Theory of Relativ-
ity). The expansion of the universe is the same in all direction. No matter
where in the sky a galaxy is measured, the ratio of its velocity to its dis-
tance is the same. Craig considers this as a veritable turning point in the
history of science83.
This discovery which shows that the universe is expanding in an
isotropic manner, introduces the question how long have been the uni-
verse expanding. «The simplest model of the universe would be one in
which the recessional velocity of the galaxies would remain unchanged
through time. In this case the expansion would have been going on for the
time it would take any given galaxy at its present velocity to reach its
present position, or in other words, by the inverse of the Hubble constant.
This is called the Hubble time and is the time elapsed from the beginning
of the expansion until the present. As the universe expands, it becomes
less and less dense. The staggering implication of this is that by thus ex-
trapolating back into the past, we come to a point in time at which the en-
tire known universe was contracted into an arbitrarily great density; if one
extrapolates the motion of the galaxies into the past as far as possible, one
reaches a state of contraction of infinite density. If the velocity of the
galaxies has remained unchanged, then one Hubble time ago, the universe
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began to expand from a state of infinite density in what has come to be
called the “big bang”»84.
The term «big bang», is an expression coined by Fred Hoyle to
characterize the beginning of the universe predicted by the Friedman-
Lamaître model. Craig says that this term is potentially misleading, since
the expansion cannot be visualized from the outside (there being no «out-
side», just as there is no ‘before’ with respect to the Big Bang).
After a series of experimentation, it has been extracted that the uni-
verse began with a great explosion from a state of infinite density about 15
billion years ago. Some scientists also hold, as we have seen, that during
the big bang space and time were also created together with all the matter
in the universe. With the big bang the universe is presented to have come
into being a finite time ago, hence does not have an eternal past. And ac-
cording to Craig what is more remarkable with the postulation of the big
bang is that it posits an absolute origin out of nothing. This happens when
one reflects the condition of «infinite density». The reason behind why, ac-
cording to Craig the condition of «infinite density» then is precisely equiv-
alent to «nothing», is because there can be no object in the real world that
possesses infinite density, for if it had any mass at all, it would not be infi-
nitely dense. Hence, according to Craig the literal application of the big
bang model requires a creatio ex nihilo or creation out of nothing85.
Craig cites some persons who support the big bang findings such as
Barrow and Tipler who emphasize, that «“at this singularity, space and
time came into existence; literally nothing existed before the singularity,
so, if the universe originated at such singularity, we would truly have a cre-
ation ex nihilo”86. On such a model the universe originates ex nihilo in the
sense that at the initial singularity it is true that “there is no earlier space-
time point” or it is false that “something existed prior to the singularity”»87.
According to Craig, «such a conclusion is profoundly disturbing for
anyone who ponders it. For, in the words of one astrophysical team, “The
problem of the origin [of the universe] involves a certain metaphysical as-
pect which may be either appealing or revolting”88. Revolted by the stark
metaphysical alternatives presented to us by an absolute beginning of the
universe, certain theorists have been understandably eager to subvert the
Standard Model and restore an eternal universe. The history of twentieth-
century cosmology has been the history of the repeated falsification of
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such non-standard theories and the corroboration of the big bang theory. It
has been the overwhelming verdict of the scientific community that none
of these alternative theories is superior to the big bang theory. Again and
again models aim at averting the prediction of the Standard Model of an
absolute beginning of the universe have been shown either to be untenable
or to fail to avert the beginning after all. For example, some theories, like
the Oscillating Universe (which expands and re-contracts forever) or the
Chaotic Inflationary Universe (which continually spawns new universes),
do have a potentially infinite future but turn out to have only a finite past89.
Vacuum Fluctuation Universe theories (which postulate an eternal vacuum
out of which our universe is born) cannot explain why, if the vacuum was
eternal, we do not observe an infinitely old universe90. The Quantum Grav-
ity Universe theory propounded by James Hartle and Stephen Hawking, if
interpreted realistically, still involves an absolute origin of the universe
even if the universe does not begin in a so-called singularity, as it does in
the Standard big bang theory91. Hawking sums up the situation: “Almost
everyone now believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at
the big bang”92»93.
«A literal application of the big bang model in which the universe orig-
inates in an explosion from a state of infinite density, that is, from nothing,
provides a simple, consistent, and empirically sound construction of how
the universe began»94.
If one wants to deny the origin of the universe ex nihilo in the big
bang, then according to Craig, one is left with two alternatives; either a
steady state model or an oscillating model. The former holds that the uni-
verse did not begin to exist but has been existing at all times the same. The
latter claims that the universe is close, that means that the universe ex-
pands from a singularity, collapses back again, and repeats the cycle indef-
initely. But it has also been proven lately that neither of these two alterna-
tives qualifies for the type of universe we have. According to Craig, the
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steady state model of the universe cannot account for certain features of
observational cosmology and the oscillating model of the universe violates
several constraints of observational cosmology which indicate that the uni-
verse is open. A model in which the universe begins at a singularity and ex-
pands indefinitely which is open by a large margin seems to be the model
that best fits the facts. Therefore, Craig concludes that the universe began
to exist95.
Well, the same conclusion could be achieved in this first scientific
exposition of Craig as to his two philosophical arguments. Following the
argument of Goetz96, the phenomenon of the isotropic expansion of the
universe is as well justifiable in the case where in the universe previously
was in a quiescent state. For, the isotropic movement will surely be made
possible by an unconditioned personal agent who is free to will it that the
then quiescent universe starts to expand isotropically. Moreover, the big
bang is just a probable consequence of the reverse of the isotropic expan-
sion.
In addition, trying to recover the issue on the singularity mentioned
by Craig as a result of the retrogress of the claimed isotropic expansion of
the universe, Enrique Moros has this to say97; that the reduction of the uni-
verse to singularity should not be identified with nothingness, simply be-
cause science does not deal with nothingness. Hence, Craig’s argument to
prove creation from nothing by a personal Creator is not definitively justi-
fiable using the observable isotropic expansion of the universe.
iv. Argument Based on Thermodynamic Properties of the Universe
This second empirical argument of Craig to prove inductively the
beginning of the universe is based on the evidence of thermodynamics.
Thermodynamics is a scientific law formed by several physicists about the
middle of the nineteenth century which brought under a general rule all the
various irreversible processes encountered in the world. This law has come
to be known as the second law of thermodynamics. Initiated by Clausius,
according to the second law of thermodynamics, heat of itself only flows
from a point of high temperature toward a point of low temperature; the re-
verse is never possible without compensation. The case of the heat is only
a part of the general tendency of nature as a whole. This means that there is
a state of general tendency toward leveling in nature that without it life
would be completely impossible. Because of such leveling, says Craig,
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when we walk into a room, the air in the room never separates suddenly
into oxygen at one end and nitrogen at the other. It is also why, when we
step into the bath, we may be confident that it will be an even temperature
instead of frozen solid at one end and boiling at the other. It is clear, says
Craig that life would be impossible in a world in which the Second Law of
Thermodynamics did not operate98.
Another development of the second law of thermodynamics regard-
ing the tendency toward leveling is introduced by Ludwig Boltzmann. This
tendency toward leveling according to Boltzmann is founded on the ten-
dency of any system to pass from a less probable to a more probable state.
The probability of a state is a function of its order: more ordered states are
less probable, and less ordered states are more probable. This follows that
the most probable state is therefore a totally disordered state, that is, a state
which is completely undifferentiated99.
Still, a third important step in the development of the second law was
the realization that disorder is connected with entropy: the greater the disor-
der the greater the entropy. Hence, another formulation of the second law of
thermodynamics could be stated: all systems have the tendency to pass from
a state of lower entropy into a state of higher entropy. Such transition accord-
ing to Craig could be prevented by two obstacles: 1) since the law concerns
probabilities, it is conceivably possible for the transition to be avoided, and
2) when the system leaks energy to its surroundings. As to the first case,
these logical possibilities are inconsequential in macroscopic systems. It is
theoretically possible for the bath to be boiling at one end and frozen at the
other, but practically it is impossible. In the second case, a further stipulation
must be introduced: the system must be closed. This leads to a fourth formu-
lation of the second law: spontaneously proceeding process in closed sys-
tems are always attended by an increase in entropy. In other words, process-
es taking place in a closed system always tend toward a state of equilibrium.
For example, if we had a bottle containing a sealed vacuum, and we intro-
duced into it some molecules of gas, the gas would spread itself out evenly
throughout the bottle. It would be virtually impossible for the molecules to
retreat, for example, into one corner of the bottle and remain100.
Craig’s interest of the second law of thermodynamics is to find out
what happens when it is applied to the universe as a whole, for by defini-
tion the universe is a closed system in the sense that it is all there is. The
universe is, on a naturalistic view, a gigantic closed system, since it is
everything there is and there is nothing outside it, no energy leakage or in-
put is possible. According to Craig, presented with a universe like this
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would mean that, given enough time, eventually the universe and all its
processes will run down, and the entire universe will slowly grind to a halt
and reach equilibrium. This is a state in which the universe reaches a state
of maximum entropy, where everywhere the situation will be exactly the
same, with the same composition, the same temperature, the same pres-
sure, etc. This state would be a state in which the universe is considered
dead, since there will be no objects anymore, but the universe will consist
of one vast gas of uniform composition. Logically, because it is in com-
plete equilibrium, absolutely nothing will happen anymore. This supposed-
ly future state of the universe, which will also be its last state, is known as
the heat death of the universe. Once the universe reaches this state, no fur-
ther change is possible. Hence, the universe is dead101.
Now, the question of Craig is that if the universe is eternal, why has
it not reached a state of maximum entropy? And given the condition that
maximum entropy is realizable with time, if the universe has always exist-
ed, according to him, it has had eternity to achieve its state of equal energy
distribution. But what we have at present is a universe in a state of disequi-
librium. The evidence that the universe shows a present state of disequilib-
rium points to the fact that the processes in the universe have not been go-
ing on forever. This means that it is only at some point in the finite past
that the universe was in a state of arbitrarily low entropy and that it has
been running down since then. In short, the present state of disequilibrium
points to a beginning of the universe102.
Nevertheless, says Craig, the argument only seems to function well
within a Newtonian world system, but with Einstein’s general relativity
wherein the universe is presented to be expanding and open, then there
seems to be no chance of an even distribution of matter. And even if the uni-
verse is closed, the gravitational pull would also prevent such an even distri-
bution. Gravity is, according to the scientists, the determining factor of the
nature of thermodynamic processes on a cosmological scale. So that, in de-
termining if the universe will suffer heat death in an irreversible thermody-
namic process, one must inquire into the effect of gravity on relativistic
world models. In this case, even if we select a model in which the universe is
expanding and open, a total equilibrium could still be realizable. Since, if the
universe goes on expanding forever, less and less gravity will hold and its
density lessens. In other words, as the universe expands the force of gravity
becomes less and less sufficient to overcome its recessional velocity. And as
it does, as its density lowers with its constant expansion, the universe will
grow cooler and cooler until it dies in a kind of heat death mode103.
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In any case, based on the law of thermodynamics there are two pos-
sibilities of the universe’s fate; either it expands continuously or either it
re-contracts, through gravitational pull. Now, either of the possibilities re-
alizes, still, the universe would reach to a state of total equilibrium; in the
case of the continuous expansion, total coldness, and in the case of re-con-
traction, total heat. It is for this reason that Craig concludes that the rela-
tivistic world models have substantially the same end as the Newtonian
world model: heat death of either hot or cold. Now again, this is clear ac-
cording to him that if the universe had existed for eternity, then the uni-
verse should now exist in some form of heat death. And since it does not,
but is still in a process of disequilibrium, it must have had a beginning a fi-
nite number of years ago104.
The problem does not however end here says Craig for another type
of model of the universe seeks to escape this conclusion: the oscillating
model of the universe. As we have seen in the first empirical argument, the
oscillating model claims that the movement of the universe is cyclical.
This claim shows that if the universe is expanding now there will come a
time that it starts to contract and expands once again, for it holds that every
expansion is followed by a contraction and vice versa. Now, this type of
universe is a universe which exists forever, or in other words a universe
which has neither beginning nor end. Heat death, therefore, is not its fate.
Craig however says that, though it is possible that contraction could hap-
pen, there are no known physical laws that could ever reverse a cosmic
contraction. Hence, what the adherents of oscillating model are claiming is
mere hypothetical possibility. Besides, if the extremity of each contraction
entails arriving at a singularity, this would make it impossible to trace
physical continuity of the universe for the reason that the extremity of each
cycle, the infinite singularity, is equivalent to nothing.
Moreover, even if bounce is possible, i.e. the universe really moves
in a cyclical manner despite the difficulty of the continuity of the absence
of something, two possibilities once again has to be considered: either the
universe is an open universe in which reversal occurs just once, or the uni-
verse is a closed universe in which reversal occurs repeatedly. The second
possibility suggests the picture of a cyclic universe, persisting definitely
into the past of the future. However, again Craig says that this picture is
defective, since according to the adherents of the oscillating model, every
cycle involves irreversible generation of entropy, hence, the maximum ra-
dius must increase from cycle to cycle. This follows that the state of en-
tropy also started low in a multicycle model, which entails that it has an in-
finite future, but only a finite past. The oscillating model still implies an
origin of the universe prior to the smallest cycle. So Craig concludes that
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even on the oscillating model, thermodynamic considerations impels us to
conclude that the universe had a beginning105.
«Whether one considers a Newtonian model of the universe, an open
model, a closed model, or even an oscillating model of the universe, ther-
modynamic considerations suggest in every case that the universe began to
exist»106.
Now, Craig continues that another file of objections can be obtained
for this conclusion. These objections Craig got from Swinburne: 1) the ar-
gument works only if the universe is spatially finite, and 2) since the law
expresses statistical probability only, then in an eternally closed system en-
tropy may at any point be decreasing rather than increasing107.
The first objection of Swinburne means to say that maybe the rea-
son why the universe is still in a state of disequilibrium, is because precise-
ly it is spatially infinite and not because it is spatially finite as Craig holds.
«Grünbaum suggests two reasons why the second law of thermody-
namics does not apply to a spatially infinite universe. 1) Entropy becomes
indefinable in a universe comprised of an actually infinite number of parti-
cles, since the particles could assume an infinite variety of complexions. 2)
If the universe is spatially infinite but contains a finite number of particles,
then in order to reach maximum entropy the particles would have to be
evenly distributed throughout all of infinite space, which is impossible»108.
Craig contests that neither of these two objections of Grünbaum can
be sustained. As regards to the first objection, it has already been justified
that an actually infinite material universe is untenable both philosophically
and empirically. «Philosophically, a universe comprised of an infinite
number of particles would involve all the absurdities entailed in the exis-
tence of an actual infinite. Empirically, there is no evidence that the materi-
al universe must be infinite; indeed, the expansion hypothesis holds that it
may not»109. In whatever field the objection be treated, Craig says that it
can in no way be real. Besides, even if we permit that the material universe
were infinite, still, according to Craig, the objection fails. «For if the inde-
finability of entropy means simply that we can no longer measure it in an
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infinite universe, then the inadequacy of our methods of measuring en-
tropy can hardly prevent entropy from increasing. But furthermore, the no-
tion of heat death need not involve the concept of entropy at all. We may
simply speak of the entire universe’s arriving at a state of equilibrium»110.
This happens simply because in the first place actual infinity if possible is
in reality a state of total correspondence of each part to each other and each
part to the whole. Hence, from the outset in a spatially infinite universe, for
Craig, we cannot even talk of a process of converting to a state maximum
entropy. We could not even talk of the process of dying, because in the first
place, a spatially infinite universe is already in a state of maximum entropy
or rather a total equilibrium, for the fact that it is infinite. This is so be-
cause actual infinity entails total perfection according to the adherents of
set theory, and this total perfection does not admit of further happening,
neither addition nor subtraction. Otherwise, if it still admits of addition or
subtraction or any type of happening, then it is not in a state of an actual in-
finite but finite. An actual infinite state could not mean other than a state of
total equilibrium. Therefore the universe cannot be a spatially infinite type
of universe.
Regarding the second objection, Craig says that it rather suggests
of a type of universe which is at all times finite and only potentially infi-
nite spatially. It assumes that for equilibrium to be achieved, the finite
particles must be evenly scattered throughout space. Craig says that this
assumption is simply false. It has been argued that as the universe ex-
pands the finite particles of matter will recede farther and farther into the
dark recesses of space, and the universe will suffer a cold death. «So even
if space itself were infinite (in that the material universe could expand in-
definitely), thermodynamic considerations would still apply to the materi-
al universe in space. As a potentially infinite but at all times finite closed
system, the universe would slowly “wind down” until it reached equilibri-
um. Because it is not now in such a state, it must have had a beginning a
finite time ago»111.
Still, a further major objection to the argument is to say that the
present disequilibrium may be nothing more than a fluctuation from a state
of equilibrium at which the universe normally exists. Craig says that the
objector here seems to have lost the sense of proportion. «For while fluctu-
ations from a state of equilibrium are physically important for micro-sys-
tems containing a few particles, when one comes to macro-systems, such
fluctuations are negligible. Schlegel comments: «The fluctuation which
would give any pronounced entropy decrease to an isolated macro-system
is, because of its extremely slight probability, only of interest as a theoreti-
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cal possibility»112. But furthermore, even if such theoretical possibilities
were actualized they would be small as to imperceptible. As Zwart ex-
plains the entropy in a closed system decreases on the average as much as
it increases, but this concerns only small fluctuations around the state of
equilibrium113. The original process which led to the state of equilibrium is
never reversed. [...] According to Zwart, proponents of this objection have
lost sight of the difference between fluctuations and processes. A process is
determinate and determinable, but a fluctuation is not. A process is a
change of state, a transition from one state to another. But fluctuations be-
long to one and the same state; they are part of the state. Thus, fluctuations
in a universe of maximum entropy, or heat death, would be inconsequen-
tial. Finding the universe in a state of equilibrium, one is given three op-
tions to make a conclusion: proposals endorsed by Paul Davies: 1) either
we are in a colossal fluctuation from the normal state of disequilibrium; or
2) the steady state model is correct (that is, the universe is open not
closed); or 3) the big bang model is correct (that is, the universe started to
exist a finite number of years ago)»114.
As regards the first alternative,
«The conjecture can be faulted on several grounds. First, a fluctuation
which produced the present low entropy condition of the universe is over-
whelmingly more likely than one which produced a still lower entropy
condition in the past. [...] Yet there are non-thermodynamic reasons why
we know that the entropy of the universe was lower in the past than it is
now; for example, when distant galaxies are observed they are seen as
they were many millions of years ago in a condition of thermodynamic
disequilibrium. Another objection [...] is that a fluctuation just on the size
of a solar system would be sufficient to ensure the existence of life on
earth, and such a fluctuation is far more probable than one of cosmic pro-
portions»115.
The second alternative fares no better,
«In recent years mounting observational evidence in astronomy, in par-
ticular the discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation
(which appears to demand earlier dense state), has led to the almost com-
plete abandonment of the steady-state theory»116.
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Therefore, the third alternative must be affirmed,
«In the absence of continual creation of matter, it is necessary the big
bang type of event. [...] Because of the finite age of these models, the entire
universe can be regarded as a sort of gigantic branch system, which was
created in a low entropy state at t=0 and is in the process of running
through its course to equilibrium. [...] As in the case of branch systems, the
initial low entropy condition of the universe simply did not exist prior to
this creation event. However, unlike the situation with branch systems, it is
not possible to account for the low entropy initial state of the universe as
due to interaction with the outside world, because the universe is the whole
world. [...] Thus one is forced to accept the conclusion, uncomfortable as
this may appear from a scientific point of view, that the negative entropy in
the universe was simply “put in” at the creation as an initial condition»117.
To sum up: Craig argued that 1) thermodynamic considerations point
to an origin of the universe a finite number of years ago; 2) these considera-
tions hold true whether we adopt Newtonian or relativistic world models, and
3) traditional objections to this argument are invalid on various counts. And
since a universe existing for infinite time could not now be in the present state
of disequilibrium, Craig concludes that the universe began to exist118.
So we have two inductive arguments that the universe began to ex-
ist. First, the expansion of the universe implies that the universe has a be-
ginning. Second, thermodynamics shows the universe began to exist.
Therefore, on the basis of both philosophical argument and scientific evi-
dence, Craig thinks that we are justified in accepting our second premise
that the universe began to exist.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence
If the universe did begin to exist, was its coming into existence just
a brute fact, which means that there was no external influence or alien to it
that caused it to exist, or rather there is some external influence that inter-
vened so as to realize its becoming? Obviously Craig says that there is.
From the first premise –that «whatever begins to exist has a cause»–
and the second premise –that «the universe began to exist»– it follows logi-
cally that «the universe has a cause». This conclusion, Craig says, «ought to
astound us, to fill us with awe, for it means that the universe was brought
into existence by something which is greater than and beyond it»119.
358 OLIVER T. MAZO
117. Ibid., pp. 139-140.
118. Cfr. ibid., p. 140.
119. W.L. CRAIG (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: a Reader and Guide..., p. 107; also
W.L. CRAIG, The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe..., p. 85.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 358
Now given that the universe has a cause for its existence, the next
question Craig asks then is what the nature of this cause is. According to
Craig, if the universe has an ultra-mundane cause then this cause must be,
an uncaused, personal creator of the universe that exists, who without the
universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and
enormously powerful120.
i. Personal Creator of the Universe
Following Swinburne, Craig holds that the causation of the uni-
verse could be explained in two possible different ways. Firstly, it could be
explained by way of scientific explanations, that is, an explanation in
terms of laws and initial conditions. And secondly, by way of personal ex-
planations, that is, an explanation in terms of agents and their volitions.
Craig claims that a first state of the universe cannot have a scientific expla-
nation, since there is nothing before it, and therefore it can be accounted
only in terms of a personal explanation121.
The conclusion for a personal Creator of the universe is implied, ac-
cording to Craig, by the origin of a temporal effect from an eternal cause.
Because one might ask that if the cause of the universe is eternal, how is it
that the universe is not also eternal, since it is the effect of the cause? Now,
this would happen if the cause of the universe was only an impersonal set of
necessary and sufficient conditions. But we know that the universe is tem-
poral. Besides, Craig says that if the cause of the universe was only an im-
personal set of necessary and sufficient conditions, it could not exist with-
out its effect.
A cause which is an impersonal set of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions would only be like the cause of water freezing. Now, the cause of
water freezing is sub-zero temperatures. Whenever the temperature falls
below zero degrees the water freezes. In this case, Craig says that once the
cause is given, the effect must follow, and if the cause exists from eternity,
the effect must also exist from eternity. This implies that if the cause of the
universe existed from eternity and it is a mere set of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions, then the universe would also have existed from eternity.
And this we know to be false. Hence, the only way for the cause to be eter-
nal but for its effect to originate a finite time ago is for the cause to be a
personal agent who freely chooses to bring about an effect without an-
tecedent determining conditions122.
THE KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 359
120. Cfr. W.L. CRAIG (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: a Reader and Guide..., p. 107.
121. Cfr. ibid., p. 108.
122. Cfr. W.L. CRAIG, The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe...,
pp. 86-87.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 359
This type of causation, wherein the cause freely chooses to bring
about an effect without antecedent determining conditions, according the
Craig, is called «agent causation». And since the agent is free, he can initi-
ate new effects by freely bringing about conditions which were not previ-
ously present. A finite time ago a Creator endowed with free will could
have acted to bring the world into being at that moment. In this way, God
could exist changelessly and eternally but choose to create the world in
time. By «choose», Craig means that God freely and eternally intends to
create a world with a beginning without changing or altering His mind
about the decision to create. By exercising His causal power, He brings it
about that a world with a beginning comes to exist. So it happens that the
cause is eternal, but the effect is not. In this way, then, it is possible for the
temporal universe to have come to exist from an eternal cause, through the
free will of a personal Creator. Craig thinks that the only way the universe
could have come to exist is through the will of a personal Creator. Thus,
we are brought, not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe, but to
its personal Creator.
Moreover, Craig noted that the personhood of the cause of the uni-
verse is also implied by its timelessness and immateriality. This is so, for
the simple reason that the only entities we know of which can possess such
properties as timelessness and immateriality are either minds or abstract ob-
jects, and abstract objects do not stand in causal relations. Hence, the tran-
scendent cause of the origin of the universe must be of the order of mind.
Craig claims that these, he calls «purely philosophical arguments
for the personhood of the cause of the origin of the universe», receive pow-
erful scientific confirmation from the observed fine-tuning of the universe,
which entails intelligent design. He says that the scientific evidence serves
to highlight the conclusion to which philosophical argument has led us.
Combined both the philosophical arguments and scientific claims, Craig
maintains confidently that he has arrived to a cogent demonstration of a
cause of the universe who is itself uncaused, beginningless, timeless,
spaceless, immaterial, changeless, powerful, personal Creator who created
the universe in time123.
Nonetheless, before going to the possible objections discussed by
Craig, an argument from Stewart Goetz seems to be reasonable why the
conclusion of Craig from how he presented his idea of the cause, does not
necessarily or definitively concludes to a creation of the universe out from
nothing:
«It is helpful to point out that a cause is not a set of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions, as Craig assumes. To understand why a cause is not a set
360 OLIVER T. MAZO
123. Cfr. W.L. CRAIG (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: a Reader and Guide..., p. 108.
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 360
of necessary and sufficient conditions – consider two interlocking gears A
& B. In a situation where both are simultaneously moving, the movement
of A is necessary and sufficient for the movement of B, and the movement
of A. However, only one of the moving gear is causing the movement of
the other. The fact that one gear is causing the movement of the other can-
not be explained in terms of the relations of necessary and sufficiency, for
these are identical both ways. The gear which is causing the movement of
the other is the one which is exercising its causal power on the other. Thus,
the exercise of causal power is the fundamental concept of causation. [...]
Given the concept of the exercise of the causal power, the following ques-
tion now presents itself: why is it impossible that a personal agent exercise
the causal power to bring about a first event in a previously existent but
quiescent universe? In response to this suggestion, Craig would probably
both point out that the exercise of causal power is an event and that wither
it was caused or it was not. On the one hand, if it (the initial exercise of
causal power) was caused, then either it was caused by a second exercise of
causal power which was exercised from eternity or was not. If the second
exercise of causal power was exercised from eternity, then the effect (the
initial exercise of causal power) would be eternal and there would be no
first event. On the other hand, if the second exercise of causal power was
not eternal but arose in the universe, then what was the cause of that exer-
cise of causal power? Presumably, another exercise of causal power? Craig
would claim that by maintaining that the second exercise of causal power
was not exercised from eternity, we end up pushing the regress of events
back step by step into the past. But it has already been proved that the tem-
poral regress of events cannot be actually infinite because an actual infinite
cannot exist. In short, the objector seems to be impaled on one of the horns
of a dilemma like that originally constructed by Craig. [...] What about the
other horn of the dilemma? Why is it not open to the objector to maintain
that the personal agent’s initial exercise of causal power was either un-
caused or caused by the agent (agent-causation)? Craig would probably re-
spond that an uncaused exercising of a causal power (or an uncaused agent-
causing of an exercising of a causal power) is an inexplicable event, an
event which occurs without any conditions. However, the objector can
claim that the personal agent exercises its causal power for a reason (or
causes its exercising of its causal power for a reason), where a reason is a
condition but not a causal condition of the exercising of the causal power.
After all, the objector might continue, Craig himself concludes his argu-
ment for a personal Creator by affirming that the creation of the universe
was “the action of a personal agent who freely chooses” to create the uni-
verse. A personal agent which freely creates the universe is an agent which
is not caused to exercise its causal power to produce its effect (or, if it
caused its exercise of its causal power, then it was not caused to cause its
exercise of causal power). Now, either the Creator’s creative free act oc-
curred without any conditions whatsoever, in which case, by his own stan-
dard, Craig would have to concede that his proof has an implausible con-
clusion, or the creator’s free act was performed for a reason, in the idea of a
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personal agent which does not create the universe but freely exercise its
causal power to start a finite event sequence in an already existing but qui-
escent universe. [...] In conclusion, Craig has not proved that the universe
was caused to exist ex nihilo by a personal Creator. If his arguments for the
impossibility of an actual infinite or the impossibility of traversing an actu-
al infinite are sound, what he has proved is either that the universe was
caused to exist ex nihilo by a personal Creator or that the universe always
existed and was quiescent until some personal agent initiated a finite chain
of events in it. As of now, I know of no philosophical argument that proves
the truth of one or the other of these disjuncts»124.
The emphasis of Craig on the personality of God to be able to cre-
ate a temporal universe, God being Himself eternal is what itself defeats
his own claims for the necessity of the temporal beginning of the universe.
Through causation of a free agent personal Creator, the universe may have
existed from eternity and it could still have finite events within it. More-
over, precisely, because a personal God is capable of freely choosing to
create the world from nothing, He could likewise freely choose to create a
world, in a sense of creating the first event, within a universe already exist-
ing quiescently previously, and in this case the observable phenomenon of
the isotropic expansion and the thermodynamic properties of the universe
are justified.
ii. Possible Objections to the Conclusion
Craig discusses some of the typical objections to the intelligibility
of his conclusion. He discussed the objections particularly of Adolf Grün-
baum as Craig finds Grünbaum’s objections to be more or less summariz-
ing the whole troop of objections against inferring a Creator of the uni-
verse125. What I will do first is to present literally Craig’s review of
Grünbaum’s objections and later on I will also give my own comments as
to Craig’s own points in answering the objections.
Craig says that Grünbaum falls into three groups. Group I seek to
cast doubt upon the concept of «cause» in the argument for the cause of the
universe:
When we say that everything has a cause, we use the word «cause»
to mean something that transforms previously existing materials from one
state to another. But when we infer that the universe has a cause, we must
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mean by «cause» something that creates its effect out of nothing. Since
these two meanings of «cause» are not the same, the argument is guilty of
equivocation and is thus invalid.
1. It does not follow from the necessity of there being a cause that
the cause of the universe is a conscious agent.
2. It is logically fallacious to infer that there is a single conscious
agent who created the universe.
But these objections according to Craig do not seem to present any
insuperable difficulties:
1. The univocal concept of «cause» employed throughout the argu-
ment is the concept of something which brings about or produces its ef-
fects. Whether this production involves transformation of already existing
materials or creation out of nothing is an incidental question. Thus, the
charge of equivocation is groundless.
2. The personhood of the cause does not follow from the cosmolog-
ical argument proper, but from an analysis of the notion of a first cause of
the beginning of the universe, confirmed by Anthropic considerations.
3. The inference to a single cause of the origin of the universe
seems justified in the light of the principle, commonly accepted in science,
that one should not multiply causes such as are necessary to explain the ef-
fect in question; positing any more would be gratuitous. Since the universe
is a single effect originating in the big bang event, we have no grounds for
inferring a Plurality of causes126.
The objections of Group II relate the notion of causality to the tem-
poral series of events:
1. Causality is logically compatible with an infinite, beginningless
series of events.
2. If everything has a cause for its existence, then the cause of the
universe must also have a cause of its existence.
As usual for Craig, he says that both of the objections given above
are based on misunderstandings.
1. It is not the concept of causality which is incompatible with an
infinite series of past events. Rather the incompatibility, as we have seen,
is between the notion of an actually infinite number of things and the series
of past events. That causality has nothing to do with it may be seen by re-
flecting on the fact that the philosophical arguments for the beginning of
the universe would work even if the events were all spontaneous, causally
non-connected events.
2. The argument does not presuppose that everything has a cause.
Rather the operative causal principle is that «whatever begins to exist has a
cause». Something that exists eternally and, hence, without a beginning
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would not need to have a cause. This is not a special pleading for God,
since the atheist has always maintained the same thing about the universe:
it is beginningless and uncaused. The difference between these two hy-
potheses is that the atheistic view has been shown to be untenable127.
Group III objections are aimed at the alleged claim that creation
from nothing surpasses all understanding:
1. If creation out of nothing is incomprehensible, then it is irrational
to believe in such a doctrine.
2. An incomprehensible doctrine cannot explain anything.
These objections are also unsuccessful according to Craig:
1. Creation from nothing is not incomprehensible in Grünbaum’s
sense. By «incomprehensible» Grünbaum appears to mean «unintelligi-
ble» or «meaningless». But the statement that a finite time ago a transcen-
dent cause brought the universe into being out of nothing is clearly a
meaningful statement, not mere gibberish, as is evident from the very fact
that it is being debated. We may not understand how the cause brought the
universe into being out of nothing, but then it is even more incomprehensi-
ble, in this sense, how the universe could have popped into being out of
nothing without any cause, material or productive. One cannot avert the
necessity of cause by positing an absurdity.
2. The doctrine, being an intelligible statement, obviously does con-
stitute a purported explanation of the origin of the universe. It may be a
personal rather than a scientific explanation, but it is no less an explanation
for that128.
Grünbaum has one final objection against inferring a cause of the
origin of the universe: the cause of the Big Bang can neither be after the
Big Bang (since backward causation is impossible) nor before the Big
Bang (since time begins at or after the Big Bang). Therefore, the universe’s
beginning to exist cannot have a cause129. Now, Craig contends that this ar-
gument pretty clearly confronts us with a false dilemma. Craig simply ad-
mits of the consistency of the probability that God created the universe si-
multaneous or coincident with the big bang. To go out from this dilemma
Craig conceives God to be timeless without creation and in time at and
subsequent to the first moment of creation. Here Craig is simply once
again giving the impression that one cannot conceive of a before or time
prior to creation in the reality of God. It is for this reason that the question
whether the cause of the big bang existed prior to the big bang is non-sen-
sible. God was simply there without time at all. And with this argumenta-
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tion Craig pronounces that none of the Grünbaum’s objections, seems to
undermine the credibility of the kalam cosmological argument for a per-
sonal Creator of the universe.
«Thus, we have been brought to the remarkable conclusion that an un-
caused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is
beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously
powerful. And this is, as Thomas Aquinas laconically remarked, is what
everyone means by God»130.
Now, as to my comments to Craig’s answers:
I do not have so much to comment on Craig’s answers to the Group
I objections. They are simply elemental and clearly justified. Hence, I skip
to the answers of the second group of objections.
Observations on answers of the Group II objections: First I have
doubts as regards Craig’s answer to number 1 objection to group II of
Grünbaum’s objections. The objection says that there is no incompatibility
between causality with an infinite series of past events. Craig responds that
indeed, there is no incompatibility between causality with an infinite series
of past events. But the question is, if an infinite series is really infinite,
then what is still the need of a cause? Does not an actual infinite series of
past events entail the absence of beginning? Now if the series of past
events has no beginning, how could it still need of a cause? I rather say
therefore that admitting of an infinite series of past events is incompatible
with the concept of causality.
The incompatibility of the existence of an actual series of past
events is seen precisely on the second answer of Craig to the II group of
objections. He says that something that exists eternally and, hence, without
a beginning would not need to have a cause. Now, this is precisely what it
means of an infinite series of past events, a series of events without begin-
ning, but has always been happening.
Furthermore, Craig’s answer to the objection 2 regarding the ques-
tion that if everything has a cause for its existence, then the cause of the
universe must also have a cause of its existence is a little bit crucial. He
says therefore that his argument does not presuppose that everything has a
cause. Rather, the operative causal principle claims that only those that be-
gins to exist has a cause. This answer could calmly be interpreted that even
if the universe is beginningless and uncaused, the idea of God would still
be acceptable and should be introduced to justify becoming within the uni-
verse. For the simple reason that, matter cannot actualize on its own, par-
ticularly providing life, a cause aside from the universe itself has to be in-
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troduced. It is where God who is also eternal enters. This probability, in-
deed, has already been introduced by Aristotle. Only that Aristotle did not
talk of God but of an efficient cause, which precisely initiates motion with-
in an uncaused universe. Hence, there is no inconvenience to accept that
not only God is eternal but also the universe itself. What actually needs
justification or cause is not the universe’s becoming, but the series of
events or change within the universe. It could be equally probable that the
universe is co-eternal with God, but the actualization within it is not,
which therefore needs a cause for its realization.
When Craig discussed the impossibility of the existence of an actual
infinite what it shows is that what really needs justification is not the exis-
tence of the universe itself but the existence of motion within it. The ques-
tion really at hand is how the series of past events arrives to us. Now, this
has nothing to do whether the universe is eternal or not. As I have said I do
not see any inconvenience to assume that the universe is eternal but with a
temporal series of past events. It is probable that the series of events or the
activity is limited within the universe. In other words, it could be likely pos-
sible also that the impossibility of the existence of an actual infinite series
of past events concerns only on the generation and corruption of the things
within the universe. So while the universe needs no cause, the change yes.
Well, science set aside, the thing is, philosophically speaking it
would be very hard to conceptualize, if not absurd to postulate of an uncre-
ated universe and everything it contains. It is hard to conceive an eternal
universe because of its contingent nature. And because of this, one has re-
ally no other option other than philosophically assume that the universe
must be created – for nothing comes out from nothing.
Observations on answers of the Group III objections:
Now let us accept that God created the universe. This might be non-
sensical for the atheists, but that is for the atheists. Science indeed collabo-
rates with philosophical postulation of the probability of the creation phe-
nomenon. The creation position becomes even questionable theologically
for those who believe. But there is still another questionable position on
the way Craig presents his creation out of nothing version. What does he
mean particularly by saying that God created the universe a finite time ago
or in a particular time T?
Is it not Craig himself who says that before the universe there was
nothing but only God who is timeless in its state of changelessness, imma-
teriality etc? If prior to creation one cannot conceive of tempus, then one
can simply not talk of «temporal prior» but only of «stancial prior» or a
previous state without reference to time. At any rate Craig only tried to
complicate this matter by introducing the creation of time itself. But is
time created? Other critiques of Craig are just reasonable enough to con-
tend him that he is begging the issue regarding the reality of time.
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It is very interesting, indeed, how Craig dedicated a whole book to
introduce his theory of the created time: Time and the Metaphysics of Rel-
ativity. He makes use of Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity of time.
He says that one needs to really go through and understand Einstein’s the-
ory of time in order to understand time. The bottom line of Craig’s work on
time says that there are two types of time131: absolute time and relative
time. Now, absolute time for him is also called as metaphysical time, a
time he applies to God. The relative time is termed by him as physical
time. Relative time is the time of the cosmos. It is for Craig the sensible
measure of the absolute time. In short, relative time is a time created by
God.
But what is time? Does time have parts? Is there really an absolute
time and a relative time? The way I understand it, time is not an entity.
Therefore, it could not be qualified as absolute or relative. Time is, accord-
ing to St. Thomas Aquinas, something that exists in the mind but with
foundations in reality. «As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by
way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by
means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by “be-
fore” and “after”. For since succession occurs in every movement, and one
part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in move-
ment, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of
before and after in movement [...]»132. In saying this, St Thomas simply
presents time as the span or lapse or duration of whatever that happens. It
is no other than the measure between the before and after of contingent’s
becoming. Time is only implied in the presence of contingents. There is
however a conventional aspect of time to identify duration. It is with this
conventional aspect of time where time functions either as coordinate or as
parameter. Time is therefore not something physical.
So going back to Craig’s postulation, God creating the universe in a
particular time T is simply incomprehensible to someone who really un-
derstands time, a time contrary to the time according to how Craig creates
it. For, the absence of contingents is absence of time. For this simple rea-
son that if ever the universe is the starting point of the contingents, it
would be incomprehensible to conceive it to be created within time. St
Thomas already suggested of creation from eternity. There is simply much
more to the events of creation than what we can really possibly explain.
The worst confusion Craig might have committed is his idea of an
eternal God, atemporal and changeless before creation and temporal and
changeable after creation. This idea is quite a hard pill to swallow. Al-
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though Craig has more or less given an apparently reasonable analogy on
this regard and although this analogy is also apparently logical, but I do not
think he has really got the thing right.
We remember that Craig, after he has proven that there is a Creator,
says that this Creator must be eternal, who without the universe is timeless,
changeless, immaterial, and must be personal. This implies that God after
creation has become temporal, changeable and material. His reason is that
God simply entered into time, a time that coincides with the cosmic time
after creation. This happens by the mere fact that He enters into a relation-
ship with the creatures and has therefore radically changed status. He says,
«Now it is my contention that since the inception of the universe and the
beginning of physical time, this cosmic time plausibly coincides with
God’s metaphysical time, that is, with Newton’s absolute time. It therefore
provides the correct measure of God’s time and thus registers the true time,
in contrast to the multiplicity of local times registered by clocks in motion
relative to the cosmological substratum. [...] Cosmic time is not merely the
“fusion” of all the proper times recorded by the separate fundamental ob-
servers, but, even more fundamentally, it is the time which measures dura-
tion of the omnipotent being which co-exists with the universe. As the
measure of the proper time of the universe, cosmic time also measures the
duration of the lapse of time for temporal being co-extensive with the
world. [...] But the theistic philosopher need see nothing disingenuous
about such an identification. It makes perfectly good sense to interpret the
lapse of cosmic time as measuring the lapse of God’s time. [...] Now God’s
metaphysical time cannot be said to be identical with cosmic time, since
the former is capable of exceeding the latter, in that metaphysical time
could precede physical time (recall God’s counting down to creation).
Nevertheless, since the inception of cosmic time, the moments of God’s
time would seem to coincide with the moments of cosmic time133. When
we reflect that God is causally related to the cosmos, sustaining it in being
moment by moment, then it seems difficult to deny that the duration meas-
ured by cosmic time is also the duration of God’s temporal being»134.
Craig’s question or his reason is that if the duration of the universe
measured in cosmic time is 15 billion years since the singularity, then, is
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not the duration of God’s creatorial activity in metaphysical time also 15
billion years? He says therefore that, «In God’s “now” – the universe has
(present tense) certain specific and unique properties, for example, a cer-
tain radius, a certain density, a certain background, and so forth; but in the
cosmic “now” it has all the identical properties, and so it is with every
successive “now”. Is it not obvious that these “nows” coincide and desig-
nate one and the present?»135 And because of this analogy Craig con-
cludes, «It seems to me, therefore, that God’s time and cosmic time ought
naturally to be regarded as coincident since the inception of cosmic time.
I do not mean to say there are in fact two times rather than one; rather I
mean simply to reaffirm Newton’s distinction between absolute (meta-
physical) time and relative (physical) time. The latter is merely a sensible
measure of the former, and my suggestion is that cosmic time is a sensible
measure of God’s time since creation»136. And in order to demoralize
some probable objections to his claim, Craig post concluded saying,
«Such an affirmation will be typically met with passionate disclamations.
Such protestations strike me, however, as being for the most part miscon-
ceived»137.
Now, is this really how simple the eternity of God the way Craig
claims it to be? But what is really eternity? Only by defining this term can
it be really understood better. Is eternity a reality different from being tem-
poral or are these two states the same? If they are the same then there is no
reason calling them in different manners. There is no reason distinguishing
the two terms. But if they are different states then they cannot also be just
confounded one from the other. But the fact is eternity is precisely distin-
guished from the state of being temporal. It is for this reason that God is
said to be eternal and the creatures are said to be temporal. We do this dis-
tinction precisely because the two realities belong to two different states or
orders, but without being totally separated from each other.
If eternity is a state that is characterized to be a state of not being
bound to time, then it can never be a temporal state regardless whether we
consider time absolute or conventional. I do not know if Craig would ac-
cept this presentation or not. But the thing is his interpretation of eternity is
an eternity seen only in one perspective, i.e. as an endless duration. But it
is not really the eternity seen as eternity. Craig, therefore, only sees eterni-
ty as infinite presence of God in every present time in the world. However,
to describe eternity, as an infinite duration is only one of the approximate
interpretations of what an eternal state is. But the real eternity is more than
just infinite duration. It is not even a state of an eternal now, but the state of
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God’s total and simultaneous possession of unending life138. It is a state of
God’s being totally perfect, a being not lacking of anything. Time simply
does not apply to God, not even the thought of countdown. What is the
sense of count down before creation? Where did Craig take this idea? In
the Bible one can read for example in a form of analogy God’s not being
subject to time. The Bible says that a million years is but one instant in
God.
Being eternal might, no doubt, be taken as just an existence in time
no longer measured by the succession of events, as in the finite universe.
But, on a strict view, there is something absurd in an eternity that includes
time, and an eternity apart from time is a vain and impossible conception.
Eternity, as a discharge from all time limits is purely negative, though not
without importance. However, eternity in its strictest sense must be pro-
nounced incommensurable with time. Eternity therefore is to be under-
stood as a state which simply does not include time but which is at the
same time related to it without being bound to it. Eternity that is to say,
would lose its character as eternal in the very entering into relations with
the changeful or becoming. What is the sense of a «temporal eternal» or
«temporal eternity»? What is temporal is temporal and what is eternal is
eternal. This is actually where lies the flaw in the presentation of Craig.
Craig therefore made the eternity of God commensurable with time. Now,
this results to a concept of a «temporal eternal God». But there is simply
something wrong with the concept «temporal eternal God»139. In simple
terms, the concept of Craig simply violates the principle of non-contradic-
tion.
This is not however the first time that eternity of God was con-
ceived to be an eternal Now, that means, commensurable with the present.
Since the time of Augustine and the Middle ages, eternity of God has been
frequently conceived of as an eternal Now. The schoolmen were wont to
adopt as a maxim that «in eternity is one only instant always present and
persistent». This, however, is but a way of describing eternity in a manner
characteristic of succession in time; but eternal Deity, rather than eternal
now, is a conception far more full of meaning for us. To speak of God’s
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eternity as an eternal Now –a present in the time-sense– involves a contra-
diction. For the eternal existence is no more described by the notion of a
present than by a past or a future. Such a Now or present presupposes a
not-now, and raises afresh the old time-troubles, in relation to eternity.
Time is certainly not a form of God’s life. His eternity means freedom of
time. Hence, it was extremely troublesome to theology of the Middle Ages
to have a God who was not in time at all, supposed to create the world at a
particular moment in time.
Craig’s view that eternity must span or include time, for God’s eter-
nal consciousness envelopes or possesses and knows the whole of what
happens in time, with all of past, present or future, that lies within the tem-
poral succession, would be acceptable. But we are by no means entitled to
say that such wholeness constitutes the eternal, for the eternal belongs to
quite another order, that, namely, of timeless reality.
Hence, eternity is not to be defined in terms of time at all. For,
again, God is to us the supra-temporal ens perfectissimum, but one whose
timeless self-sufficiency and impassable aloofness are not such as to keep
Him from being strength and helper of our temporal striving.
Eternity in the Scholastic view is the form of an eternal existence, to
which, in the unity of a single insight, the infinite series of varying aspects
or processes are, together-wise, as a tota simul, present. But this does not
imply that the eternal order is nowise different, essentially, from the tempo-
ral. Time is not to be treated as a segment of eternity, nor eternity regarded
as interminable duration. The eternal cannot pass over into the temporal, for
as eternal Being, who should think all things as present, and yet view the
time-series as a succession, must be a rather self-contradictory conception.
For the Absolute Consciousness, time does not exist; the future cannot, for
it, be thought of as beginning to be, nor the past as having ceased to be.
The eternity of God follows his being changeless140. According to
Mariano Artigas temporality or duration is only possible among natural be-
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ings, for the reason that time is conditional of change. It is also for this rea-
son that a static universe it is not possible with creatures within it. Time
therefore presupposes change. Without change, there is no time whatsoev-
er. Time does not presuppose the existence of beings, but the reality of
change in some beings, particularly the created or contingent beings,
which undergo generation and corruption141. Time therefore is not created
by God, because it is not something physical, neither an abstract entity. It
is just something that has to do with change. It is something that exists in
the mind but with foundations in reality142. That which is called time (re-
gardless whether it is absolute or relative, regardless whether it is time
conceived by Einstein or Newton), becomes something evanescing, some-
thing that could not be really understood what it consists, and will end up
in inanity or in irreality, if it is not thought of as the duration of the change-
able. It is for this simple reason that God, being unchangeable or im-
mutable, is not bound to time neither relatively nor absolutely, neither liter-
ally nor metaphorically, not even with the presence of creation. St. Thomas
continues, «now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same,
there is no before and after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the
numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehen-
sion of the uniformity of what is outside movement, consists the idea of
eternity»143. «The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time
follows movement. [...] Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it
supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is
His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other
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raleza..., p. 195.
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is it own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is
His own essence, so He is His own eternity»144.
Craig’s self-assumed obvious or sensible reference of God’s tempo-
rality with the probable 15 billion years existence of the universe is just but
not viable. In The Summa Theologica, this position as a form of an objec-
tion has already been long exposed by St Thomas. The objection says
«Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once.
But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, “His going
forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity” (Micah 5:2); and
also it is said, “according to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eter-
nity” (Rom 16:25). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous»145. To this
objection St. Thomas replies, «As God, although incorporeal, is named in
Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simulta-
neously whole, is called by name implying time and succession»146.
Another objection says «in eternity, there is no present, past or fu-
ture, since it is simultaneously whole [...] But words denoting past, present
and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eter-
nal»147. To which St. Thomas once again responded, «Words denoting dif-
ferent times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not
as if He Himself were altered through present, past, and future»148.
After I have showed the relatively real stance of an eternal state, is
it not Craig now the one who is apparently at the wrong footing? I have not
really said something new here. What I only elevated here were the real
foundations of the concept “eternity”. It is even the point why Craig said
that God must be personal because how could an eternal cause create a
temporal creature. Saying this he was actually maintaining that God is
eternal and this eternal state would not be affected by creation. God, there-
fore, being personal, remains to be eternal, unchangeable, immaterial, etc,
prior to and even after creation.
To sum up, I would say that I agree with Craig that there is a Cre-
ator of the universe. This Creator must be personal. But then, the Creator is
personal not because his personality is required for his willing to create the
world in a particular time T.149 This is just a little bit begging the issue. But
the Creator is personal because personality is a characteristic of an intelli-
gent being. Now, the universe simply shows us the possibility of the exis-
tence of this kind of being, i.e. intelligent being.
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The existence of the Creator entails that the universe is contingent
and has a beginning. Science, therefore, gives us the probability of the uni-
verse’s starting from nothing. But again as long as this probability is only
entailed by the present condition of the universe, it simply remains a prob-
ability. There is also a probability that this beginning of the universe is not
really a beginning from nothing but only a beginning of change within an
eternal universe. Although it cannot be denied the probability that the uni-
verse (all of it) is really created by God from nothing. Now, this probabili-
ty of God having created the universe from nothing is not very probable to
have been executed in a particular time T as Craig claims. We cannot con-
ceive of time prior to creation because of the absence of the mutable,
which is presupposed of time. Hence, creation out of nothing could only be
done from eternity. It is for this reason that we can consider the universe
eternal, but created in the sense that its reality shows of its being contin-
gent. Craig’s postulation of the universe being created by God in time
would only be viable if his claim that time is created is true. But as long as
time is not created, and which is the most probable, then creation out of
nothing simply cannot be done in time.
Anyhow, on the part of the atheists, I have the impression that
everything they are claiming are themselves probabilities. They do not
have any ground for their claim. In this case the position of the theists is
more probable for they have concrete proofs for their claim, including
Craig’s arguments, insufficient and defective they may be. Now some
atheists might say that theists are wrong and that their claims are mere
probabilities and uses arguments that are but products of their imagina-
tions. Commonsense tells us, however, that they are not. Because if we
hold that they are wrong or that their claims are but products of their imag-
inations or just human inventions, then we are saying that all these persons
are sick. However, one can just imagine the number of them who con-
fessed of their veracity; do you think all of them are sick? It is very unlike-
ly. Therefore, it is more plausible that God exists until proven otherwise.
Before one however should say that the there is no God and that the
possibility of creation is absurd and unacceptable, one should first ask how
did the topic of creation originate. Evidently, the topic of creation has its
origin from what we call revealed idea150. This is the simple reason why
during the time of the Greeks, including Aristotle, the possibility of cre-
ation has never been mentioned. The Greeks and Aristotle apparently did
not know and neither even have the slightest idea of creation. Only during
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the Christian era is the topic on creation introduced. Hence, one cannot just
simply say that it is absurd while the concept of creation is not even a hu-
man invention. Left to ourselves, with our own natural reason, like the
Greeks, I do not know if we could even arrive to the idea of creation. So
one can say that it is God therefore who revealed himself and who has im-
planted the idea in the mind of man in the critical moment of not attempt-
ing any rationalization. Hence, before the topic of creation is a philosophi-
cal problem, in the first place it is theological.
Nonetheless, though the possibility of creation evidently came and
is offered as a revealed idea, it does not mean that the possibility of cre-
ation could not be the subject of philosophy. Aristotle indeed said that phi-
losophizing starts with our admiration of what is real or the facts around
us. But, this does not mean that since philosophizing starts with admiration
of what one sees it could not consist also of admiring statements, like the
claimed voices that comes from God.
Juan José Rodriguez-Rosado has an apparently clear and under-
standable discussion on creation151. Perhaps it is good to discuss it here to
understand creation better.
Rosado says that in dealing with the argument of creation, it is im-
portant to distinguish three concepts, namely: the concept of creation, the
concept of deduction and the concept of emanation.
The argument from deduction is always understood as extracting or
taking something from something. It is never understood as taking some-
thing or extracting something from nothing. The argument from deduction
therefore presupposes the existence of material, a passive material which the
agent (or the cause) extracts which is latently immersed in the same matter.
Consequently, deduction presupposes a movement, for in the execution an
anterior and posterior part is presupposed. The anterior part composes the
matter from which the form is extracted, and the posterior part composes the
form extracted from the matter through the intervention of the agent.
Furthermore, the concept of emanation in principle seems to have a
more metaphysical contact with creation. Nevertheless, while in creation
there is a certain gap or distance between the cause (the Creator) and the
effect (the created), in emanation it is the cause that is extended, so to say,
its being to the effect, without being changed. Emanation is a kind of un-
folding of the notes of the cause. It is an essential unfolding of a cause
which is projected, which for exuberance is branched off in the proper be-
ing of the effect152.
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Lastly, the concept of creation is understood as the production of an
effect by the cause from nothing. It is a production of something without
supposing any material cause or condition. Obviously, in talking here of
creation, creation is referred to as an act, like doing, and not a creation as
an effect. We do not talk of the created, but the act of creating or the cre-
ative act. Creation considered as an effect is the reality of creatures. Cre-
ation considered as an act is creation situated in the realm of possibility.
Creation as an act is considered as a possibility in the reality itself that pro-
duces the totality of being. It is creation considered as an effect where all
metaphysical problems are implied153.
Creation as production of the total being, essential and existential,
precisely supposes an emanation totius enti the total emanation of being
directly from the cause. It is for this reason that creation is a relation and
not an action-passion. It is not an action-passion because there was no pas-
sive subject which could be taken as presupposed for the work of creation.
And because of this one can say that creation is not a succession or a
movement because movement or change supposes that there is something
which could be found in a «before» and «after» situation. This situation
«before» and «after» is that which expresses the name mutation or change.
But creation is from nothing, therefore it presupposes nothing material.
Hence, if creation is not a movement then it is not a change, by the absence
of matter, therefore, it cannot be considered a succession, because succes-
sion is proper to movement154.
From the argument above, one can say therefore that creation was
not done in time, because time is only the first effect of creation. Creation
is the first divine effect, it is the first effect of the creative act. But time is
the effect of change and not of creation, as time is the number of change.
Time is the first effect of the created act155.
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155. «[T]ime is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in
the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are con-
tinuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now, number
as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different
things. Hence, others assert that the unity as the principle of all duration is the cause of
the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle,
but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of
the first principle. On the other hand, other assign primary matter as the cause why time
is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of
these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or
in subject, especially if distant, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is
one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most sim-
ple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not
only as to the thing measured, but also as accident to subject; and thus receives unity
from it. Whereas to the other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the
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Creation is no other than a metaphysical transit and not a physical
movement, because there was neither time nor physical movements in this
transit from nothing to being. It is therefore clear that when we say from
nothing, this is not denying an efficient cause that from which primarily
the movement proceeds. From nothing would like to mean nothing else
aside from the divine omnipotence. As we have already mentioned earlier,
to create is to make something from nothing or to make something without
prior material presupposition.
Creation from nothing is rendered evident because if a thing does
not proceed from God, it either comes from some pre-existing matter or
not. Now, if it does not come from a pre-existing matter, then it is created.
If it comes from a pre-existing matter, then it is either we have to proceed
indefinitely tracing back the pre-existing matter, but this is impossible
within the realm of natural things, or we have to propose something first
(matter or whatever it is) which does not presuppose another earlier. Mat-
ter itself is incapable of causing the causation as it manifests in reality.
Hence, this something first to which no earlier is attributed is God, which
is not matter. But God is cause of all beings and there is nothing outside
Him that does not exist from Him. This is to say that God creates without a
previous matter156.
To admit of a universe created from eternity does not qualify the
universe to be eternal. The insufficiency of the argument of Craig lies on
the fact that he does not exhaust all options. He says for example that if the
universe did not begin to exist in time then it is eternal. But it is necessary
and an only option that the universe must begin to exist in time or else the
universe will be eternal. The mere fact that the universe began to exist
even from eternity already justifies the universe’s finiteness and temporali-
ty. This is, in fact, what Aquinas means by the specialty of the act of cre-
ation. It is for this same reason that one cannot just consider the event of
creation as a change or a part of the series of the temporal events within it.
Hence, if it is valid that in the real world, an actual infinity is im-
possible, as Craig justified, then he is contradicting himself when he iden-
tifies the universe to be part of the series of the temporal series of past
events. Since if the universe is the whole within which the series of past
events evolve, then it could not be part of the series. The series of events
pertains to the parts but not to the whole.
Moreover, neither the argument from isotropic expansion nor the
thermodynamic theory of the universe imply with necessity that the uni-
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verse really has to start to exist from nothing. Although if the universe’s
behavior does not show that it is steady or quiescent, however, this is only
true in as much as the present state of the universe is concerned. How
about the possibility of the universe’ being steady before the first temporal
event, because there is surely a first temporal event? This could also be a
possibility. Hence, what really the isotropic expansion and the thermody-
namic theory necessarily imply is only the beginning of the events in the
world. What could not be eternal therefore is only the movement of the
universe and not the existence of the universe itself.
Craig’s theism has not therefore greatly contributed to the contro-
versies of the metaphysical doctrine. What it however offered is the possi-
bility of the existence of an absolute through philosophic and scientific
proof.
CONCLUSIONS
We have seen an interesting contemporary cosmological demon-
stration on the existence of God; the kalam cosmological argument.
Though, this argument has the spirit of the classical or the medieval
thought. For this reason, it is far from being new and original. Only that
this time, the argument went beyond from being purely philosophical.
Craig tried to dilate the argument involving fields which apparently have
been perennially considered incompatible or irreconcilable, namely philos-
ophy, theology and science.
The kalam cosmological argument has its roots in medieval Arabic
philosophy and theology. The distinctive feature of the kalam cosmology
is its stress on the causation of the beginning of the universe by an agent
who is a personal Creator. One could observe right away how the author
made a lot of enormous assumptions in his claims regarding the matter. It
is for this fact that evidently his claims are very debatable and are indeed
recently very much debated.
At a first glance the reader will probably have the impression that
the proof is so simple. One really has to go inside and enter into the man-
ner how Craig justifies his claim to be able to find out that after all, his ar-
guments are more complicated as they seem to appear. Looking at the log-
ic of his premises one would most probably be directly impressed. There is
indeed logic on the premises he planted. But it is very noticeable that the
manner of his arguing is deeply defective and so is basically unsatisfacto-
ry. Nonetheless, defective may be the author’s presentation, especially in
using and interpreting terms, it sure opened to the possibility that all areas
of knowledge can be harmonized and all could be referred to the universal
truth who is God.
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Craig supports the thesis with four arguments; two of which are
philosophical and the other two scientific or empirical. On the one hand
the philosophical arguments rest on the impossibility of the existence of an
actual infinite in the real world. The scientific arguments, in continuation,
serve to disqualify the possibility of the existence of an actual infinite in
the world, both the actual infinite existence of things and the actual infinite
temporal regress of events or change. Experiments in science show that the
world is in a state of isotropic expansion. Now if the universe behaves this
way it entails that in one time the universe could be shrank back to a singu-
larity. This singularity could be equated to nothing. Another phenomenon
that the universe exhibits is its state of disequilibrium. In short, all these
scientific phenomena entail that the universe is not eternal. If it is not
therefore eternal then it has began to exist. The whole thesis argues there-
fore that 1) the existence of an actual infinite (a concept Craig took from
modern set theory) is impossible and that 2) even if it were possible, the
universe itself is not actually infinite and hence must have had a beginning.
And if the universe began to exist then it has a cause. It has a cause, be-
cause everything that begins to exist has a cause. This conclusion follows
from the principle that nothing comes out from nothing.
The arguments work by supporting the option of each premise and
then using it in the following premise. Hence, for Craig, the kalam argu-
ment is actually a series of connected arguments, which means that to be
successful, each of these arguments must be logically valid and have a true
premise. On the one hand, since the kalam cosmological argument is a se-
ries of arguments that take the form of a valid argument known as a dis-
junctive syllogism, its formal validity is beyond dispute. On the other
hand, to be sound argument, the kalam cosmological argument must have
true premises. The truthfulness of the premises of the kalam argument then
depends on two grounds for its validity, cogency and sufficiency; the
logicity for the philosophical proof on the one hand and verifiability for
the empirical proof on the other.
There are simply bulks of evaluations regarding the validity and co-
gency of the arguments expressed in the kalam style. Everything seems to
focus on the validity and cogency of the arguments. Well, some of the crit-
ics regardless of the apparent logical validity of the arguments still prefer
to think that the argument of the kalam is question begging. Some of them
are just so absurd almost nonsense that one could or will not actually un-
derstand them at all. Some, on the contrary hold that the arguments are
valid but they are not sufficient. One could also find a lot of pro-Craig
evaluations.
Now, if what the kalam argument wanted to extract from its argu-
ments is a Personal Creator of the universe who at least without the uni-
verse is timeless, changeless, spaceless and immaterial. Then I would con-
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clude that Craig has succeeded in doing it. But the God that Craig extract-
ed is no way the God the theists actually claim. What he actually succeed-
ed in conceiving is his own concept of a God, but who is a God so far from
being the general God of the Philosophers. It is no way the God understood
to be pure actuality, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent being. According to
Enrique Moros, it is not enough to validate the demonstration of the exis-
tence of God as mere attempt to elevate the meaning of the word God. This
is sure to be a middle term of the demonstration. Rather, the demonstration
should reveal the metaphysical concept of God, a God who is pure act,
who is Ipsum Esse Subsistens. This means that in the demonstration of the
existence of God, once the objectivity or reality of God is affirmed, one
reaches to a more precise concept of God which logically goes beyond the
mere nominal meaning of the name, and therefore the possibility of apply-
ing analogy for the knowledge of the divine essence arises157. Neither has
Craig been able to prove the existence of the traditional God of the Chris-
tians. What he has got is a God who is eternal at the same time bound in
time, a God that undergoes changes. It is for this reason that I would say
that Craig has just missed the point at issue. After all these years of trying
to prove the existence of God, all he did was to prove the existence of a be-
ing who is not actually the God of the Bible or of the Christians as he
claims to be, not even the God of the philosophers.
It is bold and daring on his part to actually finish claiming that he
successfully demonstrated the God conceived by St. Thomas Aquinas. If
St. Thomas were just alive by now, he would probably say, «Mr. Craig, I
simply have another concept of God. I never argued that God is a mutable
God, or that he has changed extrinsically. I did not say that God changes
by having a mental countdown before creation. I argued that God is eter-
nal, but I did not claim that after creation he became bound to time». Craig
can in no way say that his God is the God in St. Thomas, but maybe, only
the God according to his own theories.
Of course one cannot deny the fact that Craig has indeed tried
something to prove the existence of God. His arguments as regards the ex-
istence of something supernatural that could be the cause of the world is all
the while valid, regardless of the fact that some simply insist of brute real-
ity of how things are without any external supernatural cause. One cannot
deny of its acceptability and possibility.
The problem really with Craig’s presentations is rooted not only in
the fact that he has remained in the field of probabilities, but also and more
in the fact that he has altered in a great sense some of the philosophic prin-
ciples. Altering and inventing some philosophic assumptions simply bring
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with them a lot of contradictions, if not implausible conclusions. This is
sometimes a defect from people who usually want to transmit something
original. The effort to always look for something original sometimes dis-
torts the right transmission of knowledge.
Craig must have had plausible generalizations from logical premis-
es, but the way he explains these premises with his support argumentations
is simply confusing. The fact of verifying philosophic principles with sci-
ence and mathematics is a very crucial and delicate matter. And I think
Craig has risked himself too much on this aspect. I presume that, subjec-
tively or personally he must have understood what he was talking and
dealing, but he just simply missed some of the important matters, particu-
larly as regards defining terms. There were some points if really applied to
God would destroy everything and even the possibility of God.
After Craig arrived to the conclusion that God exists, it is where ac-
tually all the confusions came. Let us start for example with the ambiguity
of Craig’s putting God in a Metaphysical time. Just what does mean with
God being in a metaphysical time? Does time have parts? Is time really di-
vided into physical and metaphysical? His identification of divine eternity
to endless duration introduces God practically into time. Even without cre-
ation. He holds that God is timeless without the universe and in time after
creation. At the same time he holds that God, in exercising his conscious-
ness, must involve duration. After suggesting that God is eternal Craig also
tried to suggest that even before creation God’s existence was already in
time because it is presumed that He could not just have created the world
without prior planning and thinking. He says that surely God had a mental
countdown before creation. And this is already enough to think of time in
God.
Time in its strictest sense is just the measure of the change going
on. Time therefore, according to St. Thomas Aquinas is something which
exists in the mind but which has foundation in reality. As long as there is
change and motion, there is a span, and we call this span, time. Time is
simply the measure of change regardless of its speed. What is presupposed
of time is matter. And surely, God in all His immateriality is not bounded
to time. Time simply stays in a different condition from the timelessness or
eternity of God.
Craig said that there is no time prior to creation, and that it is possi-
ble that God must have created space and time simultaneous with the uni-
verse. But he holds that the universe is created in time. How then could the
universe be created in time if prior to it one cannot conceive of time, even
if time is created simultaneous with it? In this case then, it is more plausi-
ble to admit of a finite, temporal universe, but which is created from eter-
nity or atemporally, and not a universe that is created in time as Craig ad-
mits it is.
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Whether one likes it or not, the proofs we find here from arguments
a posteriori, do not sufficiently prove the existence of God because they
can always be argued. Craig’s points, even if they contain strong argu-
ments, aside from the fact that some use of philosophical terms contains
noticeable inconsistencies, show only the insufficiency of the empirical
justification in justifying the existence of God who is Ipsum Esse Subsis-
tens.
With all due respect to Craig it must have been his intention to re-
ally give a nice philosophical argument to prove God’s existence. But his
arguments are such defective as to impress persons in the field of philoso-
phy, much more in the field of theology. Again, Craig might have used so-
phisticated arguments to prove his claims, but they are not enough if they
only lead to contradictory conclusions. The flaw of Craig’s argumentation
is so subtle that an ordinary listener without philosophy and theology
background would probably not notice and be enticed to it. Craig’s argu-
ment is therefore attractive to persons who are simply seeking God, but
who are uninterested with whatever attribute one really gives Him. His ar-
guments are very attractive to people who have the minimalist idea of
God.
Hence, I would agree with Oppy when he says what the arguments
from the kalam style as they are presented by Craig, if valid, only demon-
strate that one could not accept a particular package of physical and meta-
physical and also reasonably deny that God exists. It is for this reason that
one cannot just also reject Craig’s arguments. Indeed, the combination of
physical and metaphysical arguments only show that after all, science if
only interpreted well is in no way contradictory or contrary to reason. The
problem between the incompatibility between science and reason has long
been an issue. And now Craig offers the possibility practically of their col-
laboration. Now, the collaboration of science is something very useful to
the problems of philosophy if treated in the proper way.
Either Craig is a theist or a fidest; he claims that he is a theist. Any-
how, he always ends up adhering to belief. Conceivably, the bottom line of
Craig’s rational attempt is only to help show that Christianity is a rational
religion, as well as an incessantly controversial one. Hence, though, he is
quite convinced that truth about God can only really be treated with faith,
nonetheless, he makes use of reason to make these evident truths more un-
derstandable and in a way more palpable for us humans. For, in our human
limitedness, according to St Thomas, these very evident truths, for reason
that they are very evident, are not evident to us.
I would like to end this work citing some practical observation An-
thony Kenny gave at the end of his discussion about the God of the
philosophers. Anthony Kenny maintains that philosophical proofs for the
existence of God will always be insufficient. Only theology can supply the
382 OLIVER T. MAZO
cuadernos filosofía-18.qxp  1/2/08  09:10  Página 382
fullness of truth about God. Nevertheless, he says that no matter how evi-
dent it is that God exists, even if God actually reveals himself, there will
still be individuals who will find it hard to believe in God, for «Ill will [...]
can corrupt the judgment in more ways than one. The belief of a believer
may be the effect of his vices as the unbelief of the unbeliever may be. And
the skepticism about the eternal world is self-destructive in a way quite
different from skepticism about the existence of God. [...] One thing seems
clear. There is no reason why someone who is in doubt about the existence
of God should not pray for help and guidance on this topic as in other mat-
ters. Some find something comic in idea of an agnostic praying to a God
whose existence he doubts. It is surely no more unreasonable than the act
of a man adrift in the ocean, trapped in a cave or stranded on a mountain-
side, who cries for help though he may never be heard or fires a signal
which may never be seen. [...] Such prayers seem rational whether or not
there is a God; whether, if there is a God, it is pleasing to him or conducive
to salvation is quite another question. Religious people, no doubt, will
have their own views about that. But if there is a God, then surely prayer
for enlightenment about his existence and nature cannot be less pleasing to
him than the attitude of a man who takes no interest in a question so im-
portant, or in a question so difficult would not welcome assistance beyond
human powers»158.
The issue whether the existence of God is philosophically demon-
strable or not will depend always from the point of view of who treats and
sees the topic. There is, however, a very demonstrable phenomenon, i.e. it
is hard to wake up somebody who is awake. For most of us, what triggers
us to do and accept things is our will to do and accept them. In like manner
what hinders us to do or accept things is the same will which becomes in-
disposed to them. And because of these contrary attitudes, one becomes
disposed and ready to believe or reject something. There are those who are
exaggeratedly disposed to take everything they like, even if it is something
improbable. On the contrary, the exaggerated unavailability and reluctance
or unwillingness would bring one to reject even the most evident, reason-
able phenomenon presented to him. I simply do not believe that the prob-
lem why there are people who do not believe in God, is because God is not
visible or physically experiential. For I’m quite sure God already appeared
himself to many. It is a fact that not only Jesus claimed himself to be God,
but there were still others. But did this solve the problem? Not at all! Why
is this so? Because, the problem does not lie on whether God appears or
not, but on whether the person wills to believe or not. The most people
with indisposed hearts can do, would be to make a lot of alibis, excuses,
logical explanations etc. in order not to believe or accept that God exists.
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I will not, however, argue that the solution to the problem of the ex-
istence of God would be the total disposition of one to believe in Him. This
is Craig’s suggestion. But I think that if only everybody could deal or do or
accept something regardless whether he wants it or not, for plain reason
that he has to deal or do or accept that something, especially if this phe-
nomenon is reasonable and evidently palpable, then maybe it would make
a difference. One could describe this maybe to be neutral or realistic. But
the fact is, though to be realistic is theoretically possible, it could never re-
ally happen. Man in his own limitedness will always be governed by ex-
citements, biases, doubts, fears, preoccupations, distastes, indifference,
factions, unavailability, pains, hate and pride. These different circum-
stances condition man in whatever he deals with. Hence, while there are
still men who are governed by these influences, then there would always
be people who will try to make what is possible impossible. What is bitter,
acid, sour and sad, is the fact that sometimes these persons who are under
influence of the said conditions are most of the times the one who claim
themselves to be rational.
St. Thomas Aquinas holds that there is always something that could
be known of God through the light of natural reason, even unaided by grace.
The process could be done by making an analogy with what is known of the
world and its constitution159. And this is precisely what Craig did.
The arguments in question may not be nothing conclusive argu-
ments for the existence of God. The fact is there will always be questions
in them, for the simple fact that from the world, we can only extract proba-
bilities160. Nevertheless, if they are not conclusive, hence, parts of them
may have to be rejected, but it is arguable that however defective or unsat-
isfactory are the arguments, we are left with at least the traces of a gen-
uinely interesting, and arguably valid proofs of the existence of God.
384 OLIVER T. MAZO
159. Cfr. C. MARTIN (ed.), The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, Routledge, London
& New York 1988, p. 99.
160. «La teología natural es un conocimiento especulativo, no práctico, pues su ob-
jeto no es, en modo alguno, operable por el hombre, sino solamente especulable. Es un
conocimiento demostrativo, no intuitivo, pues sus objeto no es inmediatamente accesi-
ble, sino laboriosa y difícilmente alcanzable, pero que se elabora con rigor y seriedad in-
telectual». J. GARCÍA LÓPEZ, Metafísica Tomista: Ontología, Gnoseología y Teología
Natural..., p. 501.
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